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Efficiencies and Merger Review in
Canada, the European Community,
and the United States: Implications
for Convergence and Harmonization
MarkA. A. Warner*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines economic efficiencies analysis in
the merger review processes of Canada, the European
Community, and the United States. In recent years, legal
counsel, academics, and policymakers have given greater
attention to international harmonization and convergence of
competition and antitrust law and policy. This trend has
been spurred by the increasing acceptance of efficiencybased economics in competition policy generally and in
merger policy particularly. The author, nevertheless, asks
whether efficiency-based merger analysis also may create
new jurisdictional conflicts among national merger
enforcement authorities. For instance, a state concerned
with its own domestic competitiveness might emphasize
domestic efficiency gains in approving a merger that
otherwise create market power concerns in an international
or global market. This approachcould resultfrom an attempt
to weigh the domestic efficiency gains againstthe increaseof
the merged firm's domestic market power. This Article
inquires whether such a merger should be regarded
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differently from an attempt by a state to cartelize a domestic
market, either to export into the internationalor global market
or to foreclose foreign penetration of the domestic market.
After reviewing the economic analysts of efflciencies, the
empirical evidencefrom completed mergers, and the laws of
the three jurisdictions, the author: (1)proposes a two-step
frameworkfor analyzing efficiencies; and (i1)concludes that
the best means of reducing potential conflicts would be to
have merger reviews conducted by an international
competition authority.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article discusses the manner in which economic
efficiencies are examined in Canada, the European Community
(EC), and the United States. The purpose of the inquiry is to
determine a framework for an international convergence or
harmonization of merger law.'
Economists and lawyers appear to be moving toward greater
consensus on the importance of efficiencies in the analysis of
competition and antitrust problems. The- analysis of mergerrelated efficiencies highlights the differences and problems of
merger enforcement in national and global markets. Should one
state care whether static or dynamic efficiencies are realized
directly within its borders? Alternately, should a state be content

with the knowledge that efficiencies realized in another state may
enhance aggregate world welfare and perhaps benefit other states

1. The focus of this Article is horizontal mergers, but a similar analysis
applies to vertical and conglomerate mergers.
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indirectly? These two questions point to the relationship between
the analysis of efficiencies and industrial policy.
With the advent of a new administration in the United States,
once discredited ideas of industrial policy are being dusted off
and presented anew under the banner of "competitiveness" 2 and
"human capital investments."3 To the extent that these existing
ideas spread to other regions of the world, the analysis of the
dynamic efficiency effects of a merger may become a source of
increased friction between states. This suggests that the growing
acceptance of efficiency analyses of mergers may not lead to
greater international convergence or harmonization of antitrust
laws.
To examine these issues, Part II of the Article reviews the
economics of efficiency analysis with respect to mergers, and
examines the evidence of the efficiency effects of mergers. Part III
focuses on Canada's treatment of merger efficiencies, because it
possesses the most developed statutory and regulatory scheme in
this regard. Parts IV and V analyze, respectively, the approaches
to this issue in the European Community and the United States.
Finally, this Article draws together the themes from the state
studies and the economic analysis discussion to determine the
implications for conflict or coordination in merger enforcement
among states.
4
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economists generally identify three broad classes of
efficiencies that are important for competition analysis:
allocative, productive, and dynamic.5
The term allocative

2.
See generally LAURA D. TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM: TRADE CONFLICT IN
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1992) (Tyson released this book prior to becoming
the Chair of the President's Council of Economic Advisors).
3.
See generally Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb.

1990, at 53 (Reich released this book prior to becoming the Secretary of Labor).
4. This review of the economics of efficiency analysis in the context of
mergers will ignore the overcharged debate about the meaning of "consumer
welfare." Instead, this Article reflects an economic approach and discusses issues
of economic redistribution explicitly.

See generally Joseph F. Brodley, The

Economic Goals of Antitrust. Efficiency, Consumer We!fare, and Technical Progress,
in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 95, 95-112 (Harry First et al. eds.,
1991); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Implications of U.S. Experience with Horizontal

Mergers and Takeoversfor CanadianCompetition Policy, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF COMPETITION POLICY 337, 339-341 (Frank Mathewson et al. eds., 1990).
5.
BRUCE DUNLOP ET AL., CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMICANALYSIS 63-64 (1987).
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efficiency references the economy-wide allocation of resources
and the impact of particular structures and industry practices
upon this allocation. Taking as an assumption the prior wealth

distribution, allocative efficiency aims to ensure that economic
distribution reflects the real, relative production costs and
relative utility or satisfaction value each consumer places on the
good or service. 6 Economists refer to this ideal state equilibrium
as Pareto optimal; no person can be made better off without
7
worsening someone else's position.
Productive efficiency "is a narrower concept than allocative
efficiency, and focuses on a particular firm or, perhaps, industry.
It addresses the question of whether any given level of output is
being produced at least cost, or alternatively whether any given
quantum of inputs is producing the maximum possible output."8
Dynamic efficiency does not concern the "performance of an
economy, industry or firm at a given point in time" (in contrast to
static efficiency measures). Instead, dynamic efficiency inquires
"whether appropriate incentives exist to increase productivity and
engage in innovative activity over time that may yield cheaper or
better goods for consumers or new products that afford
consumers more satisfaction than previous consumption
choices." 9
Economists note that "in some settings all three [efficiencies]
cannot simultaneously be realized, and where this is so,
competition policy faces complex economic trade-offs."' 0 Patents
for new inventions present perhaps the most obvious example of
these tradeoffs. By obtaining a patent, a firm may function as a
monopolist for a defined period of time to recoup its ex ante
costs. While this monopoly may be inefficient from an allocative

standpoint,

from a dynamic

efficiency

perspective,

these

temporary, recuperative, monopolistic profits are essential
incentives to innovation."1
This Article addresses the myriad questions surrounding the
issue of tradeoffs.
Oliver Williamson classically framed the

6.
Id. at 63. At this point it is probably useful to remember the admonition
of the great English economist, Joan Robinson, who said that "[ultllity is a
metaphysical concept of impregnable circularity; utility is the quality in
commodities that makes individuals want to buy them, and the fact that
individuals want to buy commodities shows that they have utillty." JOAN
ROBINSON, ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY 48 (1964).

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

DUNLOP ET AL., supra note 5. at 63-64.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id.
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tradeoff issue in a series of articles in the late 1960s. 12
Williamson set forth what he termed a "naive model" for
discussing the issue, which we should consider as Williamson's
13
tradeoff diagram.
Price

B
Wealth Transfer (WT)
P2
P1 =A

. Dead Weight Loss (DWL)

C=AC1
x. AC2

0

Quantity
-Cost Savings (CS)
Figure 1: Economic Tradeoffs

According to this model, in a competitive market each firm is a
price-taker and thus earning normal profits, not supranormal
profits, by choosing the profit-maximizing price and output for
which marginal costs equal marginal revenues.
At this
competitive equilibrium, the market price indicates the level of
utility that each consumer derives from purchasing the particular
good or service. Economists, however, have suggested that

12. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson (1968)1; Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Correctionand Reply, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 1372 (1968); Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of
Antitrust, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PRoc., May 1969, at 105 [hereinafter
Williamson (1969)]; Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense:
Reply, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 954 (1969); and Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as an
Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977) [hereinafter Williamson
(1977)].
13. This tradeoff diagram is adapted from Williamson (1968). supra note 12.
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consumers also derive a surplus utility that is not captured by
the price mechanism. Graphically, this consumer surplus is
represented by the region under the demand curve and above the
14
competitive price.

If a merger of two firms in a competitive market enables the

newly merged entity to exercise a degree of market power, 15 then
the price may rise to a new price level (P2 ) and the quantity may
fall to a new quantity level (Q2). At this new price and quantity,
the economy experiences a dead weight loss (DWL), or an allocative inefficiency. 16 There is also a transfer of wealth from
consumers of the good or service to the producer and ultimately
its shareholders.17 Thus the merged entity captures, through a
real price increase, the psychic or intangible surplus utility that
consumers had gained in competitive equilibrium. If the merger
does not render the merged entity capable of exercising market
power unilaterally or jointly with other firms, then the merger
may be procompetitive, or at least not anticompetitive.
Wiliamson's insight into this process was to question
whether a merger that simultaneously produced cost savings and
market power should be regarded as procompetitive. Graphically,

this relationship is illustrated by a reduction in the marginal cost
curve. Accordingly, Williamson suggested that in determining the
overall efficiency effects of the merger, the dead weight loss

triangle be compared to the cost savings rectangle (as indicated in

14. See the triangle marked "ABC" in the tradeoff diagram.
15. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and
Market Power In Antitrust Law, In REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY.
supra note 4, at 175, 179. The United States Supreme Court has held that
market power Is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in
competitive markets. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). This Is
contrasted with the definition of monopoly power as the ability to control prices or
exclude competition. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956). In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services. Inc., 112
S.Ct. 2072 (1992), the Supreme Court apparently followed the Krattenmaker
proposal that market power be used as in E.I. du Pont.
16. See the triangle marked "DWL" in the tradeoff diagram.
17. Consider also the following statement:
By training, economists might lean to the aggregate efficiency standard, at
least initially. After all, economics purports to have little insight Into the
"proper" distribution of wealth. But simply because economic theory has
little to contribute does not mean that society should be indifferent to the
distribution, where losers are not compensated for their losses by winners.
For example, consider a worker who steals $100 from a capitalist and
invests the proceeds at a higher rate of return than the capitalist earned.
Would the higher social return justify the involuntary transfer?
Steven C. Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, 1 J. ECON. PERsP.. Fall
1987, at 3, 9 n.7.
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Figure 1). Williamson concluded that a merger yielding nontrivial
real economies of scale must produce substantial market power
and result in relatively large price increases for the net allocative
effects to be negative. 18
Economists note that Williamson
explicitly disregarded the wealth transfer in his tradeoff
analysis. 19 Williamson did recognize, nevertheless, that if the
wealth transfer were added together with the dead weight loss,
the productive efficiency gain would not be sufficient to outweigh
the allocative inefficiency and the negative distributive aspects of
20
the merger.
The microeconomic welfare foundations of the Williamsonian
view of the wealth transfer are not beyond question.
As
discussed above, 2 1 a "change in the social state that increases
the welfare of at least one individual without reducing the welfare
of [another is considered to be] a Pareto improvement in social
welfare." 22 To the extent that a merger results in a price
increase, it should be permitted under the Williamsonian view, so
long as the resulting efficiencies are potentially sufficient to
compensate consumers for any harm suffered. However, the
Pareto principle requires an actual, not just a potential,
redistribution; therefore, the Williamsonian expectations may

exceed the microeconomic welfare theory upon which they are
based. 23
In theory at least, Williamson did not dismiss entirely the
relevance of redistributive issues for policymakers. Rather, he
believed that macroeconomic policy instruments such as taxes,
transfers, and expenditures were available and superior to

18. Williamson (1968), supra note 12. at 30-31.
19. See, e.g., Michael E. DePrano & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: Comment, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 947, 952 (1969); Alan A. Fisher &
Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerationsin Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV.
1580 (1983); Alan A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L.
REv.777 (1989).
20. Williamson (1968), supra note 12, at 28.
21. See supra text accompanying note 7.
22. Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiency Benefits in Dynamic
Merger Analysis 5 (May 10, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
23. Id. at 7. Roberts and Salop argue further that "if the purchasers of a
firm's products also own the firm," then a price increasing merger may be Pareto
improving. Id. at 9. However, they demonstrate that such an income and wealth
distribution assumption is unrealistic in the United States. Id. at 10. Nonetheless, they

argue for "an intermediate welfare standard that places some weight on both
consumer surplus and profits." Id. at 12.
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antitrust in achieving these objectives. 24 Some scholars may
protest that we do not reside in such an unrealistic world
governed by optimal policies and choices, both social and private.
In a world of second-best constraints, however, antitrust may
have a role to play in achieving redistributive goals and outcomes. 2 5 This theme is inescapable; ultimately, it is necessarily
part of the philosophy that will influence any analysis of merger
efficiencies, even if only at the margins.
Williamson's naive model dealt with the move from a
competitive market to a market in which individuals could
exercise market power. Possibly, when the market is imperfect to
begin with, an even greater productive efficiency gain would be
26
necessary to counteract the allocative inefficiency of a merger.
Williamson's efficiency tradeoff (as originally conceived) contained a clear preference for the static over the dynamic.
Williamson concluded that technical progress was most relevant
for mergers between relatively small firms, regardless of industry
concentration, and mergers involving "lower-middle sized
firms." 27 In more modem terms, market power is accompanied
by a degree of rent-seeking behavior that leads to "XInefficiency." 28
Notwithstanding the tradeoff result, which
emphasizes
productive
efficiency,
dynamic
efficiency
considerations may still suggest tight enforcement in markets
29
lacking sufficient pressure to remain contestable or competitive.
A number of questions spring immediately to mind when one

considers further the Williamsonlan tradeoff. First, is the tradeoff
relevant only in a single market context, or should one make an
24. See Williamson (1968), supra note 12, at 28; Williamson (1969). supra
note 12, at 108.
25.

See F. M. SCHERER & D. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 33-38 (3d ed. 1990).
26. See DePrano & Nugent. supra note 19, at 952. See also David W.
Barnes, Federal and State Philosophies In the Antitrust Law of Mergers. 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 263, 270-71; Paul S. Crampton, The Efficiency Exception for
Mergers: An Assessment of Early Signalsfrom the Competition Trlbunal, 21 CAN.
Bus. L.J. 371, 379 (1993).
27. Williamson (1968). supra note 12, at 30 (however as discussed below in
text accompanying notes 46-47, Williamson modifies this view in Williamson
(1977), supranote 12).
28. See Frederic M. Scherer, Antitrust Efficlency and Progress, in
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 33, 35 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson
eds.. 1991); H. Liebenstein, Ailocative Efflclency vs. "X-Inefficlency", 56 AM. ECON.
REV. 392 (1966). See also Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman, RaisingRival's
Costs, AM. ECON. REv. 267-71 (1983) (suggesting that mergers may be undertaken
to promote anticompetitive exclusion of rivals by raising competitor's costs and
hence allowing the merged entity to gain power over consumer price).
29.

See 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF

ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 154-56 (1980).
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attempt to consider the net effect on the whole economy? 30 If the
latter, how.would this be accomplished? Areeda and Turner have
concluded that a multimarket balancing approach would: (1)
raise issues of equity between groups of product consumers; and
(2) prove still more difficult for determining the net welfare
effects. 3 '
Furthermore, it is worth considering whether a
multimarket efficiency analysis would promote conglomerate
mergers over horizontal mergers.3 2 Would this be appropriate, or
should antitrust aim at neutrality in the form of corporate
organization and focus instead on the competitive outcomes in
specific markets?

A second related question

arises in the context of

33
If cost
increasingly international, if not global, markets.
savings can be generated outside of the national borders but still
within some relevant product and geographic market, should the
same tradeoff analysis obtain? Here the question would seem to
be whether, through a process of innovation, emulation,
importation, or some combination thereof, the national economy
34
may still benefit in a dynamic sense from the tradeoff.
A similar question also may be raised concerning
acquisitions by foreign corporations.3 5 The efficiency gains may
be transferred immediately outside of the state in the form of
interest and dividend payments and, in the extreme, through
transfer pricing. 3 6 It is not clear whether these concerns are
within the province of competition law or within some form of

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Sam Peltzman, Comment by Sam Peltzman in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIvIT: MICROECONOMCS 1990 324, 329 (Martin N. Baily & Clifford

Winston eds., 1990) [hereinafter BROOKINGS PAPERS]. However, this assumes that
provable and cognizable efficiencies are generated in conglomerate mergers.
Accordingly, the answer to this question may depend on whether claims of

managerial-related, transaction-based efficiencles are permitted. See nfra note
47 and accompanying text.
33. See generally C. Fred Bergsten & Edward M. Graham, Needed: New
InternationalRules for Foreign DirectInvestment, 7 INT'L TRADE J., Fall 1992, at 15,
17-23; Alan M. Rugman & Mark A.A. Warner, Strategies for the Canadian
Multinationals, In INTERNATIONAL BusINEss IN CANADA 200 (Alan M. Rugman ed.,

1989).
34. Richard G. Harris, Strategic Trade Policy, Technology Spillovers and
ForeignInvestment, in FOREIGN INvESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1.
11-13 (Donald G. McFetridge ed., 1991). However, as Harris notes, these factors

will be most relevant where entry barriers are otherwise low so that the
efficiencies can be spread throughout the economy. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally MULTINATIONALS AND TRANSFER PRICING (Alan M. Rugman &
Lorraine Eden eds., 1985).
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foreign investment review. The balance of economic opinion,
however, supports national treatment for foreign investors as
optimal, in the dynamic sense of attracting foreign direct
investment into the national economy with the consequent effects
of: (1) increased and more efficient intrafirm trade within a
multinational enterprise; and (2) technology transfer and other
knowledge "spillovers. "3 7 A third question has been lurking in
the shadows of the discussion to this point; namely, why consider
the efficiency tradeoff as a separate and distinct element of the

overall competitive effects of the merger?3 8 It is not clear why
efficiency cannot be considered in a manner analogous to entry.
If a merger will generate some efficiencies and a degree of market
power, then why not analyze the likelihood that the efficiencies
will not only inure to the benefit of the whole economy, but also
may return a market to a competitive state after some reasonable
39
period of time?
Some commentators have argued that a tradeoff analysis is
unworkable; consequently, efficiencies should be considered
using an "implicit" approach. 4 0 Under this scheme, safe harbors
would be established by measuring concentration levels that
would closely approximate a general judgment about which
transactions are likely to lead to nontrivial efficiency gains. 4 '
Other commentators have called for a variant of this approach;

37. See generally ALAN M. RUGMAN, MULTINATIONALS AND CANADA-UNITED
STATES FREE TRADE (1990); Alan M. Rugman & Mark A.A. Warner, Foreign
Ownership, Free Trade, and the CanadianEnergy Sector, 14 J. ENERGY & DEv. 1, 34 (1988); EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 84, ch. 3 (1991).
38. See Franklin M. Fisher. Horizontal Mergers: Triage and Treatment, J.
ECON. PERsp., Fall 1987, at 23. 26-27, 39, in which Fisher calls for a two-stage
merger review procedure. The first stage would rely on safe-harbors. The second
would include a more detailed analysis of the "actual likelihood of tacit collusion."
Id. at 26. As part of this process, efficiencies would be considered but the burden
of persuasion would rest on the party asserting that "the merger will create
efficiencies to offset any increased risk of anticompetitive behavior." Id. at 27.
See also C. Paul Rogers, The Limited Casefor an Efficiency Defense In Horizontal
Mergers, 58 TuL. L. REV. 503, 520-25, 533 (1983).
39. See Brodley, supra note 4, at 107-08. Brodley would recognize an
efficiencies analysis when: (1) social gain rests on the achievement of significant
production or innovation efficiencies; (2) the activity is necessary to achieve the
objective, which is not itself achievable by less restrictive means; and (3) the

activity does not permanently suppress interfirm rivalry but allows for eventual

restoration of competition. Id. at 108.
40. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 129 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112-13 (1976); Fisher & Lande, supranote 19, at 1624-50.
41. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 19; Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and
Merger Policy: A Review and Critique,J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1987, at 13, 18.
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namely, one that employs discrete safe harbors, coupled with a
augmented by
more detailed analysis of other competitive 4effects,
2
breaker.
tie
a
as
serve
to
analysis
a tradeoff
The case for an efficiencies analysis in assessing the overall
competitive effects of a merger, as opposed to a tradeoff defense,
may be strengthened depending on which theory of
anticompetitive harms is considered relevant. Presumably, if the
theory is that mergers monopolize or enable the merged entity to
exercise unilateral market power, then it may be easier to assess
the allocative inefficiency from the standpoint of increased prices
and reduced output. If the theory is that increased risks of
collusion result from the reduced number of active firms in the
industry, however, then assessing the allocative efficiency may be
significantly more difficult. 4 3 For instance, the reaction functions
of other industry participants would have to be factored into the
tradeoff calculus. Here, one must inquire whether efficiencies
result in different cost structures among firms in a market and
the consequent effect on the possibility for successful collusion.
Other dynamic factors, such as the diffusion of the cost reduction
to and among other market participants through imitation or
emulation, also would have to be considered. 4 4
Furthermore, consider a merger that could facilitate the
merged entity's ability to engage in exclusionary conduct with its
upstream suppliers or downstream distributors to raise its rivals'

costs. If the merger raises the rivals' costs so that their profit
margins drop by more than the increase in profit to the merged
entity, then there may be a net social loss. 45 Here again these
concerns may belong more properly in an analysis of competitive
effects than in a tradeoff calculation.
A fourth question, whether one opts for a competitive effects
or tradeoff approach, is what specific types of efficiencies ought to
be cognizable by policymakers? In many ways this is the most
important question of all. Ultimately, if efficiencies are too
difficult or expensive to identify, quantify, and verify ex ante on a
case by case basis, then the choice between a competitive effects
and tradeoff analysis may be moot.

42. See Fisher, supra note 38. at 26-27; Richard Schmalensee, Horizontal
Merger Policy: Problemsand Changes, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1987, at 41, 44.
43. See Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of
Coluslon, Efficiency, and Failure, 71 CAL. L. REv. 497, 522; Fisher & Lande, supra
note 19, at 1636-38.
44. See Roberts & Salop, supra note 22, at 34-35.
45. See Salop & Scheffman, supra note 28, at 268.
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The type of efficiency claims recognized may vary with one's
view regarding the wealth transfer from the consumers of the
relevant product(s) to the shareholders of the merged entity.4 6 If,
following Williamson, one is not concerned with the wealth
transfer, then any reduction in fixed or variable costs
representing a real reduction in resource use should be
recognized. 47 However, if the concern is price increases, and
hence a wealth transfer, then one may not want to recognize fixed
costs that are sunk or that otherwise do not affect the merged
entity's pricing decisions or, alternately, the entry decisions of
potential competitors. 4 8 All costs are variable in the long run, so
the longer the time frame under consideration, the more relevant
fixed costs may become, even when one is concerned with the
wealth transfer.
Williamson's initial work emphasized production efficiencies
over dynamic efficiencies (technological progress and managerial
discretion) in the problematic zone of highly concentrated
markets. 4 9 Writing a decade later, however, he concluded that
the cost savings attributable to mergers frequently are not from
50
production functions, but instead have transactional origins.
While recognizing the inherent difficulties in proof and the

inherent tendency for self-serving statements, Williamson still
would accept a wide consideration of efficiencies. In keeping with
this broad view, this Article will examine possible cognizable
production5 1 or technical efficiencies. 5 2 It will then discuss other
54
nontechnical 53 or transactional efficiencies.
With respect to operational efficiencies, Areeda and Turner
probably were on the right track in recognizing: (1) plant size;

46. See generally Roberts & Salop, supra note 22, at 63-74. In particular,
note their discussion of the role of variable costs, fixed costs, power buyer input
costs, and rivals' costs under alternate economic welfare standards. Id.
47. Id. at 63-64.
48. Id. at 68-70.
49. See supra note 12 and accompahying text.
50. See Williamson (1977), supra note 12; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, Antitrust
Lenses and the Uses of Transaction Cost Economics Reasoning, In ANTITRUST,.
INNOVATION AND COOPERATION (T. M. Jorde & D. J. Teece eds., 1992) 136, 146-47
[hereinafter INNOVATION AND COOPERATION].
51. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 29; Williamson (1968), supra note 12;
Robert Pitofsky, Proposalsfor Revised United States Merger Enforcement In a Global
Economy, 81 GEO. L. J. 195, 216-17 (1992).
52. See Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 418 (1980); Fisher & Lande, supra note
19, at 1599-1600.
53. See Muris, supra note 52; Fisher & Lande, supra note 19, at 1599-1600
(using the term "non-operational efficiencies").
54. See Williamson (1977), supra note 12.
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(2) plant specialization (assuming product complementarity); and,

to a lesser degree, (3) distribution; (4) research and development;
and (5) advertising and promotion. 55 Areeda and Turner
concluded that the case for these economies is strongest when:
(1) market demand is declining, stable, or expanding very slowly;
(2) the potential cost savings are substantial (for example, five

percent of total costs); (3) the merging firms have to expand
substantially to reach minimum efficient scale; and (4) entry is
easy and the market is expanding rapidly.5 6
Areeda and Turner rejected an efficiencies defense for capital
costs, procurement, overhead, and management skill.57 They
believed that the risk factor in capital costs would not change
materially simply because of increased firm size. Areeda and
Turner failed to appreciate, however, that if the merged firm can
pool its risks more efficiently, then the risk factor actually may
decline. Similarly, the merged entity simply may be able to
access a larger sum of capital without having to pay a premium
over the interest rate. If either of these can be proved, there is no
reason why capital cost efficiency gains should be dismissed a
priori. What Areeda and Turner really neglected to address,
however, are the other nontechnical or transactional efficiencies.
The authors magnified this oversight by permitting only their
cognizable efficiencies to be added together to achieve the
minimum requisite savings.5 8 Admittedly, while transactional
efficiencies have a more ethereal quality, they are often
substantially more than ephemeral. 59
This brings us back to the question of whether to distinguish
between real and pecuniary efficiencies. 60 The two most common
examples cited in reference to this question are tax-driven cost
savings and vertical input, supplier-squeezing cost savings. In
the case of tax-driven cost savings, one could postulate a merger
between one corporation with substantial tax credits, as a result

55.
56.

See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 29, at 175.
Id. at 168.

57. Id. at 175, 191-95.
58. Id. at 195-96.
59. See Scherer, supra note 28, at 43. Scherer comments that his studies of
multiplant mergers in the 1960s yielded modest efficiency gains provided that the
plant was well managed. However, he adds. "[t]he 1960s were a period of rapid
economic growth.
It is conceivable that in the slow-growth and even
retrenchment environment of the 1980s. the overhead and distribution-cost
economies potentially realizable through merger have Increased." Id. But query
whether this would apply a fortiori in the "no growth" 1990s.
60. See Muris, supra note 52, at 417 n.155; Wanen-Boulton, supra note 4,
at 354.
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of some otherwise poor financial performance, and another
corporation with some outstanding tax liabilities. Putting aside
possible operational efficiencies, concentrate instead on the
possible offsetting tax savings to the merged entity. Most
scholars argue that these gains are strictly pecuniary and
redistributive in nature, 6 1 and hence should not be legally
cognizable.
The argument hinges on the fact that, if a
government has to offset this tax credit with either increased
borrowing or taxation, there may occur either a social loss or a
redistribution of wealth.
However, if one assumes that a government operates an
optimally efficient public finance regime, then presumably the
government correctly estimated the demand for tax credits and
thus will need no additional borrowing or taxation.6 2 Hence there
may be no social loss or redistribution of wealth. Instead, the
merged entity may obtain a real reduction in marginal costs,
assuming that the tax credits are a variable levy and do not
represent a fixed cost. In other words, absent grounds of judicial
economy,6 3 there is no logical reason to dismiss tax-driven cost
savings a priori.
Another pecuniary cost saving that has drawn attention
occurs when the merged entity is able to squeeze lower prices out
of the profit margins of its upstream input suppliers or
downstream processors and distributors."
As with tax-driven
cost savings, however, it may not be so easy to identify and
separate pecuniary from real efficiencies. In both cases, if the
merger results in the displacement of inefficient managers who
61. See Murs, supra note 52, at 417 n.155; Warren-Boulton, supra note 4,
at 354.

62. While some may find this to be an interminably strong assumption, it
really serves to highlight the point that policy should aim "to render unto antitrust
that which is antitrust's." If the inefficiency exists in the public finance regime
then presumably it ought to be corrected there. Of course, this argument may fail
to persuade those who contend that antitrust Is a response to the world of secondbest solutions. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 25, at 33-38.
63. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, In
INNOVATION AND COOPERATION, supranote 50, at 119, 120-21, 130.
64. See Warren-Boulton, supra note 4, at 354; DUNLOP ET AL., supra note 5,
at 186. See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Antlcompetltlve
Exclusiorn RaisingRival's Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209, 27781 (1986).
Krattenmaker and Salop argue that some exclusionary rights
agreements may lower the costs of either purchasers or suppliers. Id. at 277.
Thus, they would recognize an efficiencies Justification when: (1) there are
standards for quantification; (2) the efficiencies could not be achieved in a less
restricted way, (3) the savings are not pecuniary or redistributive between
producers and input suppliers; and (4) any resultant price increase to consumers

leads to wealth-enhancing innovation and not redistribution between consumers
and producers or rent-seeking behavior. Id. at 281.
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have not bargained competitively or effectively, then what may at
first appear as a pecuniary efficiency also may be a real
production efficiency.65 This efficiency can be perceived most
readily when the input supplier possesses market power prior to
the merger. After the merger, as a result of tougher bargaining by
the merged entity, input purchases may increase due to
substitution or simply increased output by the merged entity

because of lower production costs. 65 Therefore, absent grounds
of judicial economy, a rule that prohibits a party from asserting
and attempting to prove such efficiency gains may be both
socially and privately nonoptimal.
Another interesting question emerges if one accepts the
tradeoff analysis of Fisher and other theorists.6 7 If one evaluates
a tradeoff by comparing the cost savings to the sum of the
allocative inefficiency and the wealth transfer, then logic and
symmetry would suggest that the efficiencies should be included
in the tradeoff calculus even if pecuniary efficiencies were simply
6s
redistributive.
Finally, an important remaining issue is the posture of
antitrust to various forms of corporate organization. Whether
entities are trying to distinguish between real and pecuniary
efficiencies or deciding if less restrictive alternatives to a merger
exist (such as a joint venture or another contractual form), the
entities may consider antitrust laws in their corporate
organization and accounting.
In some sense, these
considerations may represent efficiency losses, if entities devote
too much legal or other expert activity to circumventing the antitrust concern. 6 9 Thus, antitrust law should be as neutral on
these issues of corporate organization as possible. Of course, at
the margins and in a second-best world there may still be room
for these laws to have influence.
The foregoing economic analysis has indicated some of the
relevant considerations for merger analysis. First, and most
obviously, efficiencies are relevant for merger analysis. Second,
choice of market concentration or market share thresholds of
review reflects an implicit judgment about the potential efficiency
gains from mergers. Third, further analysis of the competitive

65. See Muris, supra note 52, at 417-18.
66. See Roberts & Salop, supra note 22, at 65-67. Note also that this
analysis is more readily applicable to costs that are variable, not fixed.
67. See sources cited supra note 19.
68. See Warren-Boulton, supra note 4. at 354; Roberts & Salop, supra note
22, at 70-71.
69. Peltzman, supra note 32, at 329.
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effects of a merger may prove that it is not anticompetitive.
Fourth, a quick look at efficiencies should be among the criteria
used in a competitive effects analysis.7 0 Fifth, one should use a
further efficiency tradeoff defense to determine whether a given
merger should be approved notwithstanding its market power
effects. Sixth, one should strictly construe the tradeoff analysis
and weigh the efficiency gain against the loss in allocative
efficiency and wealth transfer.7 1 Seventh, at both stages of

analysis,

a broad range

of production, distribution,

and

transactional efficiencies ought to be cognizable.
The assessment of the scope for action probably will be influenced by one's prior view of the economic benefits of mergers.
Before turning to the case studies from Canada, the United
States, and the EC, it is useful to review briefly what economic
studies suggest are the effects of merger activity on the economy
in general.
In surveying the empirical studies of the effects of mergers,
the reader should consider several caveats. First, most of the
studies have not been conducted on data dealing exclusively with
Second, most of the studies test the
horizontal mergers.
determinants of merger activity, and hence only indirectly test
whether mergers yield substantial efficiencies and result in real
wealth creation. As a result, the empirical work may be more
useful in providing support for various theoretical positions on
the appropriate thresholds for merger review, or for an analysis of
how to factor efficiencies into an analysis of competitive effects.
These studies are probably less helpful in attempting to operationalize the Williamsonian tradeoff calculus.
The merger-related empirical studies conducted to date have
been based on four types of data: (1) stock market data; (2)
accounting data; (3) productivity data; and (4) industry
concentration and profit margin data.

70. What I envision here is a procedure somewhat along the lines of the
"quick look" at efficiencies in the rule of reason analysis of horizontal restraints
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court per Justice Stevens in NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-104 (1984).

71. It may not be necessary to consider the whole wealth transfer, however,
since from the point of view of the economy as a whole, consumers are also
producers and often shareholders. Consider the significant role that pension
funds and other large institutions now have in both equity and debt markets. See
generally U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920
11992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85.012 (July 16, 1992), which

indicates that institutional investors dominate daily equity trading, accounting for
75% to 80% of the average daily volume on the New York Stock Exchange.
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The leading proponent of the use of stock market data is
Michael Jensen.7 2 Essentially, he has argued that the market for
corporate control benefits the private interests of shareholders
and social welfare by loosening control over vast amounts of
resources, thereby enabling them to move to their highest valueadded use. 73 The core of Jensen's theory is that changing
technological or market conditions require a major restructuring
of corporate assets, and new managers make these changes more
easily. Takeovers allow new managers to spot the potential
efficiencies and capitalize on them. In order to remove inefficient
managers, the purchaser often pays a substantial premium over

the prebid market price to the shareholders of the target
company. Some commentators believe that these transactions
either are redistributive or lead to rent-seeking behavior and
other X-Inefficiencies that reduce, or perhaps eliminate, any
efficiency gains. 74 Nonetheless, Jensen and others have argued
that nonredistributive cost savings of about eight percent of the
value of both companies historically have been generated. 75 On
balance, this empirical evidence 7 6 provides tentative support for
the efficiency-enhancing theories. Because most of the identified
gains go to the target shareholders, however, this evidence also
provides some support for closer scrutiny when other evidence
points to anticompetitive concerns.
Another type of empirical study uses internal accounting
data regarding the health of companies at the time of a merger
and then ascertains their subsequent profit performance. 7 7 The

72. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and
Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 21.
73. Id.
74. See generally Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization
and the Acquisition Process, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 7; Andrei Schleifer &
L.H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND
CONSEQUENCES 33 (A. Auerbach ed., 1988); Richard E. Caves, Effects of Mergers
and Acquisitions on the Economy: An Industrial Organization Perspective, in THE
MERGER BOoM 149 (L.E. Browne & E.S. Rosengren eds., 1987). However, note
that these commentators emphasize hostile takeovers and not mergers generally,
although Schleifer and Vishny admit that many takeovers are efficiencyenhancing. Schleifer & Vishny, supra.at 17-18.
75. Jensen, supra note 72, at 23. See also Michael D. Bradley, Discussion, In
THE MERGER BOOM, supra note 74, at 169, 170.
76. See also Greg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The
EmpiricalEvidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49, 58.
77. See generally DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFr & FREDERIC M. SCHERER, MERGERS,
SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987); Frederic M. Scherer, Corporate

Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments, J. ECON. PERsP., Winter 1988, at 69;
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 25, at 170-74.
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Ravenscraft and Scherer studies, which employ this approach,
use a data set from 1950-1976. By Ravenscraft and Scherer's
own admission, this data is of limited applicability to horizontal
merger evaluation, as most mergers in their data set were
conglomerate mergers, and all but very small horizontal mergers
were prohibited during the relevant time frame.7 8 Ravenscraft
and Scherer concluded that mergers initially lead to profitability
declines and efficiency losses; however, in subsequent rounds of
selloffs of acquired units, mergers did lead to net efficiency

gains.7
the

9

In fact, Scherer himself has noted that the merger wave of
1980s was more likely to involve the breakup of

conglomerates than their creation.80 This more recent breakup
behavior is similar to the older selloffs that created identified
gains in efficiency. Consequently, one would expect to see earlier
If anything,
evidence of these gains in recent experience.
Scherer's data supports the conclusions from the stock market
studies. Not surprisingly, Scherer argues for tough presumptions
against sizable horizontal mergers, which can be rebutted with
proof of the likelihood of substantial specific efficiencies. 8 1
The third type of study, conducted by Frank Lichtenberg,
uses data on productivity to measure the efficiency effects of
mergers. 8 2 Lichtenberg's study spans the period 1972 to 1986.
He concludes that changes in ownership are associated with
significant improvements in total-factor productivity, which is 8a3
direct, if not the purest, measure of productive efficiency.
Interestingly, Lichtenberg found significant productivity gains
irrespective of whether the merger was generated by management
buyouts or by leveraged buyouts, which were so common in the
1980s. 8 4

While these productivity studies tend to support the

results of the other approaches, one should not overstate their
import. Assessing the Williamsonian tradeoff requires comparing
the gains in productive efficiency with the losses in allocative
efficiency to determine a net welfare effect. Notwithstanding this
reservation, these productivity estimates could be applied more
usefully to an efficiencies consideration in the context of other
competitive effects of a merger.

78.

RAVENSCRAFT & SCHERER, supra note 77, at 211-12, 224-25.

79, Id, at211-12.

80. Scherer, supra note 77, at 76-77.
81. RAVENscRAFr & SCHERER, supra note 77, at 225.
82.
(1992).

83.
84.

See

FRANK R. LICHTENBERG,

See Id. at 127.
See Id. at 130-31.

CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND PRODUCTVITY
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A fourth approach to assessing efficiencies employs a
comparison of concentration levels with profitability measures
such as the price-cost margin.8 5 Much of this work is empirically
suspect. For instance, Salinger, who uses a data set from 1971
to 1984, initially found a weak relationship between levels of
concentration and price-cost margins. He correctly identified the
rise of foreign imports as the source of this breakdown. However,
he then proceeded to modify the data to remove foreign imports

from the United States industrial structure.8 6 On the basis of
this fundamental misunderstanding of the competitive process,
he hypothesized that identified costs and prices increase with
concentration. Salinger, therefore, concluded that mergers may
not lead to efficiencies and that there exists a role for tough
enforcement.8 7 He reasoned that cost and price reductions do
not occur because the industries start from an oligopoly position.
Salinger's conclusions are also of limited utility because the
data set included few horizontal mergers. However, recent work
by Stewart and Kim tends to support his conclusions with respect
to horizontal mergers over the very limited time period of 19851986.88 In this study, Stewart and Kim found no efficiency gains
in highly concentrated industries, minor efficiencies in lowly
concentrated industries, and negligible efficiencies in moderately
89
concentrated industries.
The degree of confidence one can give to these results is not
clear due to the short-term nature of the data set. Mergerinduced efficiencies could be more dynamic or at least long term
in nature. Furthermore, when these studies measure net welfare
gains, they compare increases of industry profits to the sum of
the wealth distribution effect (loss in consumer surplus) and to
the allocative efficiency effect (dead weight loss). Therefore, the
studies do not address the Williamsonian model. Nonetheless,
as Peltzman has observed, these studies still could support a
Williamsonian tradeoff argument, provided that a strong burden
of proof was imposed on the party asserting the potential
efficiency. 9 0

85. See John F. Stewart & Sang-Kwon Kim, Mergers and Soclal Welfare In
U.S. Manufachtring 1985-86, 59 S. ECON. J. 701 (1993); Michael Salinger, The
Concentraton-MarginsRelationship Reconsidered, In BROOKINGS PAPERS, supra note
32, at 287.
86. See Salinger, supra note 85, at 306-07.
87. Id. at 318-20.
88. See Stewart & Kim, supra note 85, at 716-18.
89. Id.
90. Peltzman, supra note 32, at 329.
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All of these empirical studies support the view that mergers
should be reviewed by applying thresholds based on a prior
efficiency theology. Then, efficiencies should be factored into the
analysis as part of an assessment of the overall competitive
effects of the merger. 9 1 Because some mergers may lead to real
long-term efficiency gains and welfare increases, this analysis
should be supplemented by a strictly construed tradeoff analysis
as a final step.
The empirical studies generally conclude that the effects of
mergers on corporate research and development are negligible or
marginally negative. 9 2 The value of this data should not be

overemphasized, as the sample set was not limited to horizontal
mergers. However, this does not imply that merging parties
should not be allowed to show, subject to a sufficiently strong
burden of proof, that the proposed transaction will be efficiency
enhancing.
Finally, the empirical studies are also somewhat helpful in
the controversial area of tax-driven efficiencies. Using a data set
covering the period 1968 to 1983, Auerbach and Reishus 93 found
that the tax benefits associated with acquiring a firm's tax losses
or unused tax credits exert an insignificant influence on merger
activity. However, the acquiror's use of tax losses and credits to
offset the income of the target, and the option to step up the basis
of the target's assets without paying capital gains tax do tend to
have some influence. More importantly, Auerbach and Reishus
found that the resulting productive efficiencies could be over 10.5
percent of the target's market value.9 4 These are significant cost
savings even by Areeda and Turner's standards. Auerbach and
Reishus compared these actual gains against potential gains from
a set of constructed mergers that did not take place. 95 While this
may be useful in suggesting the cause of the merger, the actual
91.

Further support for this view can be found in three case studies of the

price effects of FTC-reviewed horizontal mergers. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
CASE STUDIES OF THE PRICE EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS xi-xii, 76-77 & n.64

(Laurence Schumann et al. eds., 1992). This study does not deal with the welfare
effects of these mergers except by showing that (1) efficiency gains in mergers in

concentrated markets may not lead to price decreAses and (2) efficiency gains
combined with other competitive factors such as foreign competition may
effectively restrain price increases.
92.

See Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effects of Takeover Activity on Corporate

Research and Development, In CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 69, 93 (Alan J. Auerback ed.,
1988); Bronwyn H. Hall, The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial
Research and Development, In BROOKINGS PAPERS, supra note 32, at 85, 121-24.
93. See Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, The Effects of Taxation on the
Merger Decision, In CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note 92, at 157, 178.

94. Id. at 171.
95. Id. at 158.
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gains also are important in indicating the potential for real cost

savings, and thereby may be relevant for antitrust analysis.
III. CANADA

A. Enforcement Framework
The Competition Act 6 sets out the basic statutory scheme
for merger review in Canada. Under the Competition Act, the
federal cabinet appoints a Director of Investigation and Research
(Director) to investigate conduct regulated by the Competition
Act. 9 7 The Director can initiate an investigation on his own, 98 at
the request of the Minister for Industry and Science, 9 or at the
request of any six persons residing in Canada.' t The Director is
largely independent of the government, as the Minister of Justice
may not require the Director to reach any particular conclusion,
although0 l he can request the Director to make further inquiries.

Part VIII of the Competition Act deals with mergers and
delineates the matters reviewable by the Competition Tribunal
(Tribunal).' 0 2 The Tribunal consists of not more than four judges
of the Federal Court-Trial Division, who are appointed by the
Minister of Justice, and not more than eight lay members, all of
whom are appointed on the recommendation of the Minister for
Industry and Science.' 0 3 Every application to the Tribunal is
heard by three members, one of whom must be a judge.' 0 4 The
Tribunal is a court of record,1° 5 and its decisions on questions of
law can be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and
ultimately to the Supreme Court of Canada.' 0 6 There is no

96.
97.

Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.).
Id. § 7.

98.
99.

Id. § 10(1)(b).
Id. § 10(1)(c).

100. IdL § 9.
101. Id. § 22.
102. Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C.. ch. 19, § 3 (2d Supp.), Part I (1985)

(Can.).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 10.
This section also provides, for sittings by five members,
although in practice this has never occurred.
105. Id. § 9.
106. Id. § 13. This section also applies for appeals on questions of fact with
the leave of the Federal Court of Appeals.
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private right of action with respect to mergers available in either
the Tribunal or the courts.1 0 7 Section 92 of the Competition Act
provides that the Director may apply to the Tribunal for an order
with respect to a merger that he finds "prevents or lessens, or is
likely to prevent or lessen, competition substantially."
In
practice, under the Director's "compliance approach to
enforcement," the Director will not apply to the Tribunal if he can
achieve satisfactory undertakings or if he chooses simply to
monitor the merger. 108 The Tribunal possesses wide powers to
order a dissolution of a completed merger, in whole or in part, or
to order that a proposed merger be abandoned in whole or in
part.1 0 9 The Director cannot make any order more than three
years after a merger has been substantially completed. 1 10
Section 93 of the Competition Act enumerates the factors that the

Tribunal may consider in reviewing a merger.

These include:

foreign competition (which is probably the most significant
factor), business failure, the availability of acceptable substitutes,
barriers to entry, including regulatory and trade barriers, the
extent of effective competition remaining, and the likelihood of the
removal of a vigorous and effective competitor.
More importantly for purposes of this Article, the
Competition Act directs the Tribunal to consider: (1) "the nature
and extent of change and innovation in a relevant market,""'

107. Competition Act, supra note 96, at § 36. The Competition Act does,
however, provide a private right of action in respect of. (I) certain other offenses in
relation to competition, including conspiracy, bid-rigging, misleading advertising,
and resale price maintenance; and (U)the failure of any person to comply with an
order of the Tribunal or another court.
108. For a critical analysis of the Director's use of undertakings and lack of
applications to the Tribunal since 1986. see William T. Stanbury, An Assessment

of the Merger Review Process Under the CompetitionAct, 20 CAN. Bus. L.J. 422, 427
(1992) ("Moreover, the focus of the merger review process has been in the
Director's office rather than in proceedings before the Competition Tribunal.").
109. Competition Act, supra note 96, §§ 36, 92(1)(e), (f): see also Brodley,
supra note 4, at 115-18; Frederic M. Scherer, Comment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS,
supranote 32, at 327.
110. See Competition Act, supra note 96, § 97; Brodley, supra note 4, at 11518 (advocating a two stage efficiencies review process: ex ante and ex post);
Scherer, supra note 109.
111. Competition Act, supra note 96, § 93(g). This language is similar to that
found in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 85(3),
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], which came into force on
January 1. 1958. The EEC Treaty provides that in assessing the effect on
competition of agreements among undertakings, an agreement shall not be void if
it: "contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit." This is generally taken to be the source of the efficiency
defense In Article 2(1)(b) Council Regulation 4064/89 of December 21, 1989 on
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and (2) "any other factor that is relevant to competition in a
market that is or would be affected by the merger or proposed
merger." 112 These two factors implicitly permit an analysis of
efficiencies in the competitive effects analysis. Furthermore,
achieving efficiencies is specifically mentioned in the purpose
section of the Competition Act. This is significant because this
section is not a preambular statement, but rather is incorporated
in the statute, thus avoiding any doubts about its applicability.
Section 1.1 of the Competition Act provides:
The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and
adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand
opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets
while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign
competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and
medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to
participate in the Canadian economy and in order to provide
consumers with competitive prices and product choices.
Clearly not all of these goals are vectors possessing a common
sign, and this section provides little guidance in weighing the
magnitude of each of these purposes. That Section 1.1 clearly
envisages a balancing of competing factors, however, suggests
that efficiencies should be considered in assessing the competitive effects of a merger. There is some publicly available evidence"L3 that this competitive effects efficiencies analysis has

the Control

of

Concentrations

Between

Undertakings

[hereinafter

Merger

Regulation].

112. Competition Act, supra note 96, § 93(h).
113. The following news releases and annual report references of the Director
all cite efficiencies as a factor in the competitive analysis: 1987 DIR. INVESTIGATION
& RES. ANN. REP. (Consumer & Corp. Affairs Can.), Mar. 31, 1987, at 15-16
[Merger of Canadian G.E. Ltd. and Westinghouse Can. Inc. ("efficiency gains may
result"); Merger of Rothmans of Paul Mall Ltd. and Benson & Hedges (Can.), Inc.
("substantial efficiency gains in production and distribution would result");
Acquisition by Fletcher Challenge Ltd. of British Columbia Forest Products Ltd. ("a
number of production and distribution efficiencies would result ... due to more
effective coordination of inputs and transportation facilities"); Acquisition by
George Weston Ltd. of the Chocolate Confectionary Operations of Cadbury
Schweppes Can. Inc. ("substantial efficiency gains were expected to result")];
CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS RELEASE No. 88-4, TRAILMOBILE ALLAYS
COMPETITION ACT CONcERNS-AcQUISITION OF FRUEHAUF TO PROCEED (Jan. 18, 1988)
("potential for efficiency gains"); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS RELEASE
NO. 88-9. DIR ANNOUNCES DECISION ON INTERBAKE AcQUISITION (Feb. 1, 1988)
("efficiencies in relation to the export of products"); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS
CAN., CCAC No. 189 10062 E 88-02, INFORMATION RESPECTING THE ACQUISITION OF
THE ASSETS OF INTERBAKE BY NABISCO AND CULINAR ("efficiencies in the production,
sale, marketing and distribution"); 10138 DIR ANNOUNCES DECISION ON DOFASCO
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AcQuisrrloN OF ALGOMA (Sept. 30, 1988) ("efficiencies are expected to arise in
relation to capital expansion and operating savings, such as rationalization of
product lines and reduced freight costs"); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS
RELEASE No.

11044, DIR ANNOUNCES DECISION ON WOLVERINE ACQUIsrrION OF

NORANDA METAL INDUSTRIES (Nov. 2, 1988) ("significant efficiency gains, thereby
becoming a more effective international competitor"); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS
CAN., NEWS RELEASE No. 10190, DIR'S DECISION ON E.B. EDDY SALE TO SCOTT (Feb.
10, 1989) ("efficiency benefits ... for example operating savings such as reduced
freight costs, which are expected to Improve the company's domestic and
International competitiveness."); 1988 DIR. INVESTIGATION & RES. ANN. REP.
(Consumer & Corp. Affairs Can.), Mar. 31, 1988, at 10 [Merger of C.I.B.C.
Securities Inc./Gordon Capital Corp. ("merger would be procompetitive to the
extent that the new entity would be well placed to compete in the international
market and (provide) benefits resulting from access to a greater capital pool.")];
CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS RELEASE No. 10186, DIR ANNOUNCES
DECISION ON ASEA BROWN BOvERI INC. ACQUISITION OF POWER TRANSMISSION AND
DISTRIBUTION BUSINESS OF WESTINGHOUSE CANADA, INC. (Feb. 13, 1989) ("efficiency
considerations"); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN.. NEWS RELEASE NO. 10188, DIR
DECISION ON THE ACQUISITION OF THE ASSETS OF DOMGLAS INC. BY CONSUMERS
PACKAGING INC. (Apr. 25, 1989) ([plarties expect to achieve $53.9 million annually
in efficiency gains which arise from production and operating savings, such as
rationalization of excess capacity and reduction of freight costs. The parties will
make every effort to implement the claimed efficiencies within three years. This
should allow the parties to better meet foreign competition both in Canada and
the U.S."); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., CCAC No. 189 10224 E 89-04,
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE ASSETS OF
DOMGLAS INC. BY CONSUMERS PACKAGING INC. ("The parties claim near-term
production and operational efficiency gains of $53.9 million per year, together
with other qualitative efficiencies. These savings amount to 10 percent of [their
combined sales] in 1988. The parties submit that the need to achieve these gains
is essential to the industry's long-term survival in the face of [international and
United States] competition. [They] will provide reports to the Director on the

implementation of [the] measures and the achievement of these gains.");
CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS RELEASE NO. 10256, PROPOSED MERGER OF
THE BREWING OPERATIONS OF MOLSON AND CARLING O'KEEFE (Jul. 6. 1989) (". . . likely

to give rise to substantial gains in efficiency throughout most of Canada, and
particularly in Quebec. The Bureau will monitor the parties' efforts to achieve
these efficiency gains."); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS RELEASE No.
10338/90-36, COMPETITION BUREAU WILL MONITOR ACQUISITION OF PALM DAIRIES IN
THUNDER BAY (Aug. 28, 1990) (".. . likely to result in substantial efficiency gains
that will benefit producers, dairy processors and consumers"); CONSUMER & CORP.
AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS RELEASE No. 10342/90-42, DIRECTOR WILL NOT OPPOSE SALE OF
TEXACO CANADA'S ATLANTIC ASSETS (Oct. 5, 1990) (".

.

. has identified potential

efficiencies and synergies between its . . . refinery and the Atlantic assets to
enable it to become a lower-cost producer"); 1990 DiR. INVESTIGATION & RES. ANN.
REP. (Consumer & Corp. Affairs Can.), Mar. 31, 1990, at 14-15 [Merger of Molson
Companies Ltd. and Elders DL Ltd. ("merged entity would be largest brewer in
Canada, number six in North America and number twenty world-wide")];
CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., CCAC No. 10382 91-05, MAPLE LEAF MILLS
LIMITED/OGILVIE MILLS LTD. COMPETITION ANALYSIS ("The parties anticipated that the
partnership would yield substantial gains in efficiency related to production,
distribution, and administration." However, the Bureau staff reviewed the plan
and concluded that "the majority of the claimed gains would likely be attained by
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been recognized and utilized by the Director and the Bureau of
Competition Policy, which the Director heads. 1 14 In merger
decisions, efficiency always emerges as only one of the factors the
Director considers; foreign competition also plays a key role. 115
A careful review of these decisions suggests that the first
Director and, to a lesser extent, his immediate successor
conducted an implicit competitive effects efficiencies analysis in
the merger context. Of the eighteen public references to the
successful use of this efficiencies analysis, fourteen appear to
have been conducted during the term of the first Director and
four in the term of the second, although one of these concerned
an amendment to a file opened during the tenure of the first
Director. On the basis of publicly available information, it is not
possible to determine what proportion this represents of the
aggregate turnover in all cases reviewed. 11 6 A recent decision,
Maple Leaf Mills, suggests that the second Director primarily
1 17
applied a tradeoff defense.

The feature of the Competition Act that has received the most
attention with regard to efficiencies is not the implicit competitive
effects efficiencies analysis, but rather the tradeoff defense in
Section 96 of the Competition Act. Section 96(1) provides that
the Tribunal shall not make an order when the merger "has
brought about or is likely to bring about gains" in efficiency that:
(1) "will be greater than, and will offset, the effects of the

the parties acting independently .... As a result, the claimed gains were not
found to outweigh the likely anti-competitive effects of the partnership.").
114. When the amended merger provisions came into effect on June 19, 1986,
the first Director was Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C., who served until October 30,
1989. He was succeeded by Howard I. Wetston, Q.C., who in turn was succeeded
on June 16, 1993 by George N. Addy. See CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS
RELEASE No. 86-6. APPOINTMENT OF NEW DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH
(Apr. 29, 1986); CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., NEWS RELEASE No. 10264,
GOLDMAN TO LEAVE COMPETITION BUREAU: NEW DIRECTOR NAMED (Aug. 29, 1989):
CONSUMER &

CORP. AFFAIRS CAN.,

NEWS RELEASE

No.

11238\93-22,

ACTING

APPOINTMENT TO BUREAU OF COMPETITION POLICY (June 21, 1993).

115. See R. S. Khemani, Merger Policy in Small vs Large Economles. In
CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AT THE CENTENARY 205, 213-14, 217 (R. S.

Khemani & W. T. Stanbury eds., 1992). Khemani, a former Director of Economics
and International Affairs and Senior Policy Advisor in the Bureau of Competition
Policy, has said that "[in cases where acceptable efficiencies have been identified,
other considerations such as effective foreign competition were also relevant in
mitigating competition concerns." Id. at 217.
116. See Infra note 147 and accompanying text.
117. Further evidence of this view will be discussed below in reference to a
recent decision of the Tribunal in Director of Investigation and Research v.
Hlllsdown Holdings (Canada) Ltd., 41 C.P.R. 3d 289 (Comp. Trib. 1992). See Infra
notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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prevention or lessening of competition;" and (2) "the gains in
efficiency would not likely be obtained" but for the merger.
Section 96(2) directs the Tribunal to consider the following
factors: (1) will the gains result in a significant increase in the
value of real exports; and (2) will they result in a significant
substitution of domestic products for foreign products? Finally,
Section 96(3) instructs the Tribunal to disregard "gains in efficiency by reason of a redistribution of income between two or
more persons."
Apparently, the Competition Act provides a defense in the
event that market power is found to result from the merger; it
also permits efficiencies to be considered with the other
competitive effects of a merger. Th1s raises a number of interesting questions. First, the Canadian Parliament presumably did
not intend that the same test be applied in both of these cases. It
would make sense, therefore, for the efficiency exception in
Section 96 of the Competition Act to be construed more strictly
than the efficiency analysis contained in Section 92.118
The second question concerns the meaning of the reference
to the "effects of the prevention or lessening of competition" in

Section 96(1). Do these effects include the redistributive wealth
transfer rectangle or just the allocative inefficiency triangle
illustrated in Figure 1? As argued above, logic implies that if
redistribution is Ignored in the calculation of efficiencies, then it
also should be ignored in the tradeoff analysis. 119 Under this
reading of the statute, it would seem that the relevant effects
should not include the redistributive effect. 120 If this view is
correct, then there must be some other sense in which the
efficiency exception is meant to be more strictly construed than
the efficiency analysis. Perhaps the answer lies in the standard
of proof or certainty required.
Or, perhaps, the Canadian
Parliament either did not see the contradiction or did not deem it
to be a problem.
Another area of concern raised by Section 96 is the
recognition of efficiency gains from export promotion or import
substitution. While these gains may be welfare-enhancing from
the point of view of the Canadian economy, they easily could be
welfare-reducing or simply redistributive in terms of the global

118. Contra Calvin S. Goldman & John D. Bodrug, The Hillsdown and
Southam Decisions: The First Round of Contested Mergers Under the Competition
Act 15 (Dec. 15, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
119. Id. See also Crampton, supranote 26, at 390-94.
120. Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 118, at 15.
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economy. 1 2 1 These measures, however, probably only represent
a genuflection to the current state of trading relations and their
concomitant second-best solutions. 12 2
Of the two, export
promotion would be less problematic if the market power and
efficiency analysis applied to a product and geographic market
that crossed the Canada-United States border or some other
international configuration.
B. The MergerEnforcement Guidelines
The
Merger
Enforcement
Guidelines
(Canadian
Guidelines), 12 3 issued by the second Director in March 1991,
discuss the subject of efficiency in much greater detail. The
Canadian Guidelines generally follow the statutory scheme of the
Competition Act. They begin with market definition, turn to
evaluative criteria or competitive effects, and then to the
efficiency exception. Given the discussion above regarding the
use of review thresholds and safe harbors as implicit efficiency
judgments, this Article will discuss only briefly market shares
and concentration.

121. The Director, has acknowledged this conundrum outside the merger
context with respect to R&D joint ventures, export consortia, production sharing,
and specialization agreements, but the analysis clearly fits here as well. See
Howard I. Wetston, Director of Investigation and Research of the Canadian
Bureau of Competition Policy, Notes for an Address to the International Bar
Association (Oct. 1, 1991), In CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., SPEECH No.
10612\91-27, at 7.
122. A staff officer *in Canada's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade has recently written critically of this aspect of Section 96. NICOLAS D. DIMIC,
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS & INT'L TRADE CAN., POLICY STAFF PAPER No. 93/09, MERGER
CONTROL UNDER TRADE LIBERALIZATION: CONVERGENCE OR COOPERATION? 35 n.63
(Aug. 1993):
In the Bureau's view, subsection 96(2) ... is not intended to expand the
class of efficiency gains considered by the Tribunal, but merely draws
attention "to the fact that in calculating the merged entities total output
for the purpose of arriving at the sum of unit and other savings brought
about by the merger, the output that will likely displace imports, and any
increased output that is sold abroad, must be taken into account." While
such an interpretation renders the subsection meaningless, it is equally
true that a positive change in the trade balance Is not an efficiency gain in
economics either. While the ultimate intent of this subsection remains a
mystery, one suspects that legislators confused trade effects with efficiency
gains.
Id.
123. DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS
CAN., INFO. BULLETIN No. 5, MERGER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES (March 1991)
[hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES].
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Section 4.2.1 of the Canadian Guidelines provides that the
Director generally will not challenge a merger on the basis that
the merged entity will be able unilaterally to exercise greater
market power than in the absence of the merger, when the
postmerger market share would be less than thirty-five percent.
Similarly, using a theory of the interdependent exercise of market
power, the Director generally will not challenge a merger when:
(1) the postmerger market share of the four largest firms is less
than sixty-five percent; or (2) the postmerger market share of the
merged entity would be less than ten percent. Section 4.2.1
indicates that market share and concentration data are
necessary, but not sufficient, for the Director to challenge a

merger. 124
The Canadian Guidelines do not indicate how to conduct the
competitive effects efficiencies analysis. Section 4.9 describes in
general language how to consider change and innovation, and
Sections 4.10.1 and 4.10.2 describe, as additional evaluative
criteria, market transparency and transaction value and
frequency. Part 5 of the Canadian Guidelines, however, does
describe how the Director will perform the tradeoff analysis under
Section 96 of the Competition Act.
An interesting feature of the Canadian Guidelines is that in
some cases efficiencies may be considered that would likely be
attained in markets which are not the focus of the
investigation. 125 This consideration arises when the nature of the
particular efficiencies would prevent their achievement but for the
merger.126
In assessing whether the efficiencies could be
achieved otherwise, the Director will consider the market realities
of the industry involved. In general, the Director will not exclude
the market realities on the basis that the efficiencies
"theoretically could be attained through internal growth, a joint
venture, [or] specialization agreement," if the common industry

124. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 4.2.1. The market share
thresholds are set rather high given the fact that Canada as a small open
economy has generally had high levels of industrial concentration and that
domestic competition is largely checked by foreign imports. See Khemani. supra
note 115, at 206-14.
125. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 5.2.

126. Id. § 5.2 n.53. This approach contrasts with the United States practice.
See Howard I. Wetston, Commentary on "Implicatlons of U.S. Experience with
Horizontal Mergers and Takeovers for CanadianCompetition Policy," In THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF COMPETION POLICY 369, 372 (Frank Mathewson et al. eds., 1990).
Nonetheless, efficiencies should be generally realizable across the entire market.
See Howard I. Wetston, Director of Investigation and Research of the Canadian

Bureau of Competition Policy, Notes for an Address:
Enforcement Guidelines 12 (Aug. 13, 1992).

Canada's

Merger
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practice would not incorporate these realities. 127 With respect to
less anticompetitive mergers that may produce efficiencies, the
Director will only consider "existing alternative merger propos12 8
als."
Another interesting feature of the Canadian Guidelines is the
treatment of gains that are redistributive in nature. While the
Competition Act proscribes consideration of these efficiencies, the
Director nevertheless will inquire into whether, for example,
increased bargaining leverage that achieves wage concessions or
discounts from suppliers is cost Justified. 12 9 As discussed above,
this is helpful given the difficulty in distinguishing real and

pecuniary efficiencies. 1 3 0 Nonetheless, the Canadian Guidelines
indicate that tax-related gains, bargaining leverage gains, and
gains from reduced output, service, quality, and variety are
13
"generally found" to be redistributive. 1
In attempting to operationalize the tradeoff calculus, the
Director recognizes the largely discretionary and subjective
nature of the enterprise. However, the Canadian Guidelines
indicate that the Director will make an effort to weigh quantitative
efficiency gains against quantitative anticompetitive effects and
qualitative gains against other qualitative gains.1 3 2 The Canadian
Guidelines indicate in substantial detail that the Director
considers production (economies of scale and scope), distribution,
and transactional efficiencies as long as these efficiencies reduce
the long-run average unit costs. Thus, the Director will consider
both real-fixed and variable costs. 133 With respect to dynamic
efficiencies, the Director acknowledges that these are qualitative
in nature and extremely difficult to measure; hence he focuses on
134
production efficiencies.
The Director makes an effort to account for inflation and to
apply a common discount rate to future anticipated

127. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 5.2.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 5.3.

130. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
131. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 5.3.

However, an asset sale that

reduces "ongoing expenditures ... or results in a lower overall cost of capital...
will ordinarily not be excluded." Id.
132. Id. § 5.4.

133. Id. at App. 2. A consequence of including fixed costs efficiencies is that
in Canada, assuming that the concerns of the redistributive nature of tax-related
efficiencies can be answered, they will be easier to include.
134. Id. at App. A.
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efficiencies. 1 3 5
The costs of achieving the efficiencies are
deducted.136 What the Canadian Guidelines do not indicate,
however, is over what time frame efficiencies must be realized. Is
it over two years, as in entry analysis,1 3 7 or is it longer? If so,

how much longer, and how is the difference in treatment
rationalized?
The Canadian

Guidelines

indicate

that

the

relevant

anticompetitive effects of concern are those that produce
allocative inefficiency and not wealth redistribution.1 3 8 On this
point, however, the Director recently has been controverted by
the Chair of the Tribunal. In Hillsdown Holdings,1 3 9 the first
Tribunal decision in a contested merger case, the Director asked
the Tribunal to order that Hlllsdown, which indirectly had
acquired a rendering company, divest itself of that business because Hfllsdown already operated a similar plant within the
relevant market. The Tribunal denied the order on the grounds
that competition, although lessened, would not be lessened
substantially. Citing United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 14
the Tribunal noted that Hillsdown Holdings was a borderline case
decided in light of the dynamic changes occurring in the
market. 141
The Tribunal could have stopped there, but it did not,
choosing instead to discuss Section 96 of the Competition Act in
dicta. After reviewing the textual academic support for the
Williamsonian tradeoff, the Chair found that: (1) both the English
and French texts of the Competition Act refer to the prevention or
lessening of competition; (2) if Parliament had intended this to
mean only allocative efficiency effects it would have explicitly said
so; (3) the legislative history indicated that Parliament had

135. Id. § 5.7.1. Section 5.7.1 provides that the discounting of gains and
losses will be done over intervals of time so as not to discriminate against the
stream of value of the gains. Id. § 5.7.1. If this were not done, then they may be
over-discounted because they begin in the future, but the anticompetitive effect
occurs immediately. See Crampton, supra note 26, at 380.
136. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supranote 123, § 5.7.2.
137. Id. 0 4.6.2. However, with respect to entry, the Director has noted in
footnote 45 that "Igliven that section 97 of the Act imposes a three year limitation
period in respect of challenges to completed mergers, it is not generally considered
to be appropriate to employ a period of longer than two years in this context." Id.
0 4.6.2 n.45.
138. Id. § 5.5. See also footnote 57 which states "[when a dollar Is

transferred from a buyer to a seller, it cannot be determined a prioriwho Is more
deserving." Id. § 5.5 n.57.
139. Director of Investigation and Research v. Hillsdown Holdings (Canada)
Ltd., 41 C.P.R. 3d 289 (Comp. Trib. 1992).
140. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
141. Hlilsdown Holdings, 41 C.P.R. 3d at 330-31.
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considered earlier bills that would have required a consideration
of
of less than the total effect; (4) one of the traditional purposes
14 2 (5)
competition law is to protect consumers from higher prices;
the purpose section of the Competition Act supports this view by
referring to providing consumers with competitive prices; (6) the
purpose section does not explicitly indicate that providing
competitive pricing for consumers is subordinate to the first
enumerated goal, promoting the efficiency and adaptability of the
economy; and (7) the legislative history does not contradict this
interpretation of the purpose section. 14 3 Citing to the works of

Fisher, Johnson, and Lande, 14 4 the Chair suggested that the
efficiencies should be balanced against the sum of the allocative
45
inefficiency and the wealth transfer. 1
Practitioners have criticized the Tribunal's decision as being
an overly narrow reading of the Competition Act that would
146
render the Section 96 exception a mere "academic possibility."
Despite these criticisms, the Tribunal did reach the correct
decision under the Competition Act as it is now written. All is not
lost, however, for efficiency in Canada. As suggested above, a
less obtrusive interpretation of the Competition Act would be to
read an initial efficiency analysis into the competitive effects
assessment and implicitly into the review thresholds. If this were
done, given the difficulties of proof, there is no good reason why
the efficiencies exception should not be just that-an exception.
The burden of proving efficiencies would be much less stringent
when a review indicated that other competitive effects alone, or
combined with efficiencies, would assure that effective
competition remains in the market. A more onerous standard
would be applied if market power concerns became apparent.
Crampton has argued that, as no mergers have ever been
approved on the basis of the exception in the six years since it

came into force, the Tribunal's reading is too restrictive. 147 This

142. Interestingly, the Tribunal cited a United Kingdom source for this
principle, not a Canadian or United States text. RicHARD WwisH, COMPETION LAW
12-15 (1985).
143. Hlllsdown Holdings, 41 C.P.R. 3d at 337-43.
144. See Fisher et al., supra note 19.
145. Hlllsdown Holdings, 41 C.P.R. 3d at 347. The Chair also queried whether
wealth transfers are always neutral. For instance, she hypothesized a merger
between two drug companies that would produce a life-saving drug. Id.
146. See Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 118, at 15; Crampton, supra note 26.
at 386.
147. Crampton, supra note 26, at 387. See also Id. at 381 n.32 (one merger
was provisionally approved on this basis, however, by the time of final decision,
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view fails to appreciate that, at least on the basis of the limited
publicly available information, 148 the first, as well as perhaps the
second, Director has been applying implicitly, if not explicitly, a
149
competitive effects efficiency analysis.

What the new Director must now do is to incorporate
explicitly the past, and to some extent the present, implicit
practice into the Canadian Guidelines, rather than disregarding
the advice of the then Chair of the Tribunal and presiding judicial
member in the Hillsdown Holdings case. 150 In so doing, the
Director should make clear exactly how this competitive effects
efficiencies test has been implemented.' 5 ' Reviewing the publicly

other information about their competitive factors was found that allayed the
market power concerns); Khemani, supra note 115, at 217.
148, See Stanbury, supra note 108, at 428-29, who criticizes the fact that the
Director does not provide even redacted information regarding the resolution of
merger cases, except for very short statements in annual reports and speeches.
Finally, information about the standards applied to merger cases is very
limited because the direct participants in the merger review process,
notably lawyers for the merging parties, their consultants, consultants to
the Bureau, and Bureau officials, are reluctant to talk about their
experience.
They may be concerned that they will dissipate their
specialized human capital or are legally barred from talking because they
had access to confidential information. In any event, very few individuals
are able to obtain direct knowledge of more than a relatively few cases
each year.
I.

at 430.
149. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
In fact, it is equally
plausible that there have been few cases reaching Section 96, because of the "fair,
large and liberal construction and interpretation" that is already being given to

efficiencles under the Competition Act. Interpretation Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-23, § 11
(1991).
150. See Howard I. Wetston, Director of Investigation and Research of the
Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy, Notes for an Address: Developments and
Emerging Challenges in Canadian Competition Law (Oct. 22, 1992), In CONSUMER
& CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., SPEECH No. 10882\93-02, at 16; see Howard I. Wetston,
Director of Investigation and Research of the Canadian Bureau of Competition
Policy, Notes for an Address: Decisions and Developments: Competition Law and
Policy (June 8, 1992), In CONSUMER & CORP. AFFAIRS CAN., SPEECH No. 10728\9207, at 5.
151. The Bureau insists that its only efficiencies analysis is found in Section
96 of the Competition Act. This view is contradicted by Khemani, a former
Director of International and Economic Affairs at the Bureau, in a study funded
by the Bureau and which uses "confidential case fles." See R. S. Khemani & D.
M, Shapiro, An Empirical Analysis of CanadianMerger Policy, 41 J. INDUS. ECON.
161, 167 (1993). He concludes that "the decision not to challenge particular
mergers was further buttressed by the possible existence of efficiencies." Id. at
165 n. 10. His study of cases between 1986 and 1989 indicates that efficiencies
were among factors cited in the assessments of case officers in 27% of cases. Id.
at 167 (Table I). It is unclear how efficlencies legally could be so considered
absent a finding of market power, if the Bureau rejects the statutory
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available information on the decisions summarized in footnote
113, it appears that once the Director finds strong import
competition, he is prepared to permit mergers in Canada that
generate scale economies, which in turn may generate exports. If
this is the case, the Director should make this clear.
The Canadian Guidelines do not add much to the
interpretation of the export promotion and import substitution
efficiency considerations. The Chair of the Tribunal, however,
has raised the issue by querying whether a national competition

authority should be neutral to wealth transfers in mergers when
the efficiencies may be generated to a foreign-owned firm.1 5 2 As
discussed above, l5 3 similar reasoning could apply to mergers
between a Canadian firm and a foreign firm. These concerns are
not irrelevant, considering that between 1986 and 1992, 64.4
percent of the 5,847 mergers publicly reported in Canada
included a foreign-owned or foreign-controlled acquiring
1 54
company.
As long as the relevant markets are international or global,
absent second-best considerations, the reflexive economic answer
is that such wealth transfers still should be regarded as neutral.
Neutrality simply means that: (1) while some money may be lost
to the Canadian economy, Canadian industry ultimately should
benefit from the "spillover" effects discussed above; and (2) if
capital markets are efficient, the purchase price should include
the discounted present value of the future income stream to the
acquiring foreign firm.' 5 5
In short, if one finds acceptable
efficiencies, then even in the most extreme case, when the merger
leads to higher Canadian prices, the wealth transfer is not necessarily lost to the Canadian economy. Thus, even in the tradeoff

interpretation set out herein. As a practical matter, counsel routinely provide
evidence of efficiencies in'submissions to the Bureau.

152. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for a discussion of similar
musings by the Director.
153. See supranotes 33-37 and accompanying text.
154. These are my own calculations drawn from statistics reported in 1990
DIR. INVESTIGATION & RES. ANN. REP. (Consumer & Corp. Affairs Can.), Mar. 31,

1990, at 5 (Table 1) and 1992 Din. INVESTIGATION & RES. ANN. REP. (Consumer &
Corp. Affairs Can.), Mar. 31, 1992, at 5 (Table 1). A more desirable statistic would
involve the aggregate turnover involved but this is not provided by the Director.
155. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Janus A. Ordover &
Alan 0. Sykes, The Antitrust Guidelinesfor InternationalOperations: An Economic
Critique, In 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 4-1, 4-9 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989):
Thomas W. Ross, Discussant'sComments, In FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONoMIc GROWTH 28, 30. But see Harris, supra note 34, at 12-13.
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analysis, no distinction may need to be made between foreign and
domestic firms.
In conclusion, the Competition Act has two separate
efficiency tests that need to be considered in the merger context:
one as an implicit part of the competitive effects analysis; and the
other as part of a tradeoff analysis. To clarify the nature and
application of these two tests, the Director should acknowledge
publicly their existence and indicate how the first test is
operationalized.
Additionally, the second test, the tradeoff,
should be construed strictly; this may include aggregating some
degree of wealth transfer with the dead weight loss when effecting
the tradeoff. From an aggregate global welfare perspective, the
protectionist elements of the tradeoff analysis may be nonoptimal.

Finally, while Canada properly recognizes a broad range of
efficiencies, the Director should clarify the time frame over which
these must be realized.
IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The European Economic Community Treaty (EEC Treaty), as

recently amended by the Treaty on European Union, represents
an attempt to bring twelve sovereign nations together for political
and economic reasons, but at the same time allow them to retain
their separate identities.'" 6 Thus, despite the fact that the focus
in this Article is on the EC as a whole, a full review of mergerrelated efficiencies analysis would also have to examine the
individual laws of the various Member States.
Article 3(f) of the original EEC Treaty (Article 3(g) of the
amended EEC Treaty) states that, in achieving the purposes of
the EC, the activities of the EC shall include "the institution of a
system ensuring that competition in the common (internal)
market is not distorted." Generally speaking, the core of EC
competition policy is contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty, which set out the rules applying to undertakings.
Article 85(l) lists and Article 85(2) prohibits agreements
between undertakings "which may affect trade between the
Member states and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the

156. See EEC Treaty, supra note 111, pmbl., arts. 2-3. For a more detailed

discussion of the interplay of these objectives and EEC competition law, see Sm
LEON BRrrTAN, EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLIcY: KEEPING THE PLAYING FIELD LEVEL

(1992); Eleanor M. Fox, Merger Control In the EEC: Towards a European Merger
Jurisprudence, In COLLABORATIONS AMONG CoMPETIToRs: ANTITRUST POLICY AND
EcoNoMIcs 297, 298-301 (Eleanor M. Fox and James T. Halverson eds., 1992).
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common market." However, Article 85(3) permits a defense that
these agreements contribute "to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit."'15 7 This defense applies only if the agreement imposes
restrictions that are indispensable to competition and that do not
increase the possibility of eliminating competition in a substantial
part of the market. Article 86 addresses abuses of a dominant
position and provides for no defenses.
It has not always been (and still may not be) clear how
merger regulation fits into the scheme of Articles 85 and 86.
Because other authors already have done so,' 5 8 this Article does
not trace this relationship in any great detail. Two points
regarding merger regulation in the context of Articles 85 and 86,
however, are highly relevant to this discussion. In Continental
Can,I5 9 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found "abuse" to
exist when "an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens
such position in such a way that the degree of dominance
reached substantially fetters competition, i.e., that only
undertakings remain in the market whose behavior depends on
the dominant one." 160 In short, the ECJ found that if Article 86
covered mergers, it would do so only if the mergers resulted in a
strengthening of a dominant position. With respect to Article 85,
it was not until its dicta in R.J. Reynolds' 6 ' that the ECJ

indicated that mergers might be reviewable under Article 85,
which does permit an efficiencies defense. On the basis of these
limited comments, and because the EC Council believed that
neither Articles 85 nor Article 86 alone would be adequate to
regulate mergers, the EC Council passed the Merger Regulation
on December 21, 1989.162
Article 2(1) of the Merger Regulation directs the European
Commission (Commission) to begin in each case by defining the
relevant product and geographic markets. However, prior to even
this step, the Commission must first find that the combined
'"turnover" of the undertakings involved in creating a

157. See discussion supranote 111.
158. See generally PIERRE Bos ET AL., CONCENTRATION CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 69-114, ch. 3 (1992).
159. Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973
E.C.R. 215.
160. Id. at 245.
161. Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, British American Tobacco Co. and R.J.
Reynolds Indus. v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487, 4578.
162. See Merger Regulation, supranote 111.
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concentration pass certain thresholds set out in Article 1 of the
Merger Regulation.
One could argue that these thresholds
provide an implicit guide to the Commission's judgment about
the efficiency properties of mergers, or at least those mergers with
a "Community dimension."
The standards require that the
undertakings have an aggregate worldwide turnover of
approximately United States 5.6 billion dollars and an EC-wide
turnover of United States 279 million dollars, unless each
undertaking has two-thirds of its turnover from one and the same
Member State.1 6 3 Below these thresholds, Member States may
have differing implicit views of merger-related efficiencies.
Once the Commission has completed its market definition,
Article 2(b) sets out the factors to be considered in determining
whether a concentration is "compatible with the common
market." This is essentially the competitive effects analysis. In
their analysis, Commission considers factors such as: market
position, economic and financial power, available substitutes
upstream and downstream, barriers to entry, demand trends,
and the interests of consumers. Additionally, the Commission
will consider economic and technical progress, provided that it is
to the advantage of consumers and does not form a barrier to
competition. This final component of the competitive effects test
is narrower than that listed in Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty
itself, which specifically refers to improvements in the production
and distribution of goods.L6 4
If an efficiencies analysis is taking place, it appears to be in
the context of the competitive effects assessment generally and
not as part of some Wlliamsonian tradeoff defense. Indeed, from

the consumer benefit language of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty
or Article 2(b) of the Merger Regulation, it would appear that the
EC's approach is more in line with the Canadian Tribunal's
decision in Hlllsdown Holdings than with the Canadian
Guidelines. Given the uncertainty regarding the relevancy of
Article 85 to mergers and the fact that Article 86 does not provide
for any defenses, it is to be expected that the Merger Regulation
would not emphasize an efficiency defense in the merger area,
which has traditionally focused on market dominance.
Dieter Schwarz of the Directorate-General for Competition
(DG-IV) has described this form of analysis as a "structural
approach" based on evaluating the effects of a merger on effective

163. My calculations are based on an ECU/United States exchange rate of
1.115 quoted on January 27. 1994 applied to ECU 5000 million and 250 million
respectively. See ForeignExchange Markets. FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1994, at 30.
164. See EEC Treaty, supra note 111, at art. 85(3).
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16 5
competition, not just "the efficiency related to a given merger."
The Commission's background studies supporting this selective
merger policy indicate that: (1) increasing firm size does not
always lead to allocative or productive efficiency or innovation; (2)
only mergers above a certain threshold of market concentration,
16 6
which varies from industry to industry, reduce competition;
and (3) the oligopolistic structure of EC markets permits
sufficiently intense competition, especially when the market is
16 7
open.
Assuming that the Commission is conducting a competitive
effects analysis of mergers,'" one should be able to review some

of the Commission's decisions to see how the efficiencies
component of that analysis is being conducted in the embryonic
The starting point for this
state of EC merger regulation.
69
examination is the Commission's decision in de Havilland,1
which presents its clearest discussion of efficiencies to date. The
de Havilland case arose in the context of the acquisition of a
Canadian subsidiary, de Havilland, of a United States aerospace
company, Boeing, by a consortium of a French aerospace
company, Aerospatiale SNI, and Alenia-Aeritalia e Selina Spa of
Italy. Even under the most generous definitions of product and
geographic markets, the merged entity would enjoy a global
market share of nearly fifty percent, and a EC market share of
sixty-five percent.' 70 In reviewing the competitive effects of the
merger, having considered all the factors in Article 2(b) of the
Merger Regulation, the Commission was concerned that a
strengthening of Aerospatiale's dominant position would result
were the merger to occur. 17 1 The Commission concluded that
any efficiencies generated would likely give Aerospatiale the

165. See Dieter Schwarz, EEC Merger Policy: Panel Discussion, in 1988
FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST., supra note 155, at 25-8-25-9; see also Dieter Schwarz,
New EEC Regulation on Mergers, Partial Mergers and Joint Ventures, In 1988

FORDHAM CORP. L. INST., supranote 155, at 21-1 [hereinafter Schwarz II1.
166. Schwarz II, supranote 165, at 21-4-21-5.
167. See Id. at 21-7.
168. See Fox, supra note 156.
169. Commission Decision of October 2, 1991 declaring the incompatability
with the Common Market of a Concentration (Case No. IV/M.053-AerospatlaleAlenla/de Haviland)1991 O.J. (L 334).
170. Id. § 26.
171. Id. § 72. For the purposes of this paper, I will invoke the ceterisparibus

assumption in respect to the other competitive effects findings.
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power to exclude competition and, in the long run, gain power
over consumer prices.1 72
Several important points emerge from the Commission's
analysis in de Havilland. Putting aside the relative merits of the
factual findings in the case, it is clear the Commission has
indicated that it may factor efficiencies into a competitive effects
analysis. In contrast to the apparent Canadian approach, the
apparent understanding of the Commission is that efficiencies are
not always procompetitive, especially when generated from
173
imperfect competitive markets.

If efficiency gains cannot be spread throughout the industry
or the economy within a reasonable time frame, then they may
reinforce other barriers to entry. Although the merged entity may
earn supranormal profits, a potential entrant will have to
consider that the merged entity's costs are lower and that after
entry, the merged firm may profitably set its price below the costs
of the entrant. Entry may be deterred even if the merged entity
can make a credible threat' 7 4 to potential entrants that it wil set
prices in this manner. In de Havilland,the Commission hinted at
this sort of dynamic analysis by examining whether the merged
entity would gain long-run market power in the sense of
excluding competition. Despite this hint of a new approach, the
Commission nevertheless went on to assess the net effects of
losses in allocative efficiency against gains in productive
efficiency, in keeping with the traditional approach of Fisher and
75
other theorists.1
The de Havilland case does raise some concerns. One may
read the language of the decision to imply that efficiencies are
always likely to strengthen a dominant position.' 76 Again, as
discussed above, this interpretation would be entirely consistent
with the legal framework that preceded the Merger Regulation. It
172. Id. § 69. The Commission's theory was that consumers (i.e., airlines)
would be "locked in" to purchasing from Aerospatiale over a full product range,
and hence Aerospatiale could engage in predatory pricing to exclude competitors
in two of the product market ranges. Id.
173. See DePrano & Nugent, supra note 19; Crampton, supra note 26 and
accompanying text; Schwarz II, supra note 165, at 21-2-21-3. See also Fox, supra
note 156, at 316.17; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supranote 91.
174. For a discussion of credible threats in the context of predatory pricing.
see generally, Donald G. McFetridge, Predatory and DiscriminatoryPricing, In THE

LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLIcY 71, 78-81 (Frank Mathewson et al.

eds., 1990).
175. See Aerospatlale-Alenla/deHavilland, supra note 169, § 70.
176. Id. § 69 ("[T]he Commission does not consider that the proposed
concentration would contribute to the development of technical and economic
progress ....
Even if [it did] this would not be to the consumer's advantage.").

Id.
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is not clear that an extended dynamic analysis has been made or
whether these efficiencies will be deemed to spread through
innovation or emulation throughout the industry or the
economy. 17 7 The most compelling evidence that the Commission
favors the latter view, however, comes not so much from de
Havillandbut from a range of other Commission decisions. 17 8
A more recent decision of the Commission may signal a slight
move away from the traditional approach. In Accor/WagonsLlts, 1 79 after finding that a proposed merger would give the

merged entity a dominant position, the Commission stated that:
"It is not certain that there would be any improvement in
technical and economic progress to the benefit of the consumer.
Even if this were not the case, the Commission considers that
there are other possible means of achieving it." 8 0° Admittedly,
this is a pretty thin basis for proclaiming a new approach, but at
least the Commission assessed the competitive effects of
efficiencies without indicating that they significantly impeded
effective competition per se. The Commission rejected the
proffered efficiencies on the familiar and generally uncontroversial grounds that they were: (1) achievable by "other possible
means" (presumably less restrictive); (2) insufficiently detailed;
and (3) overly speculative. 18 1 Yet, the Commission also added the
more controversial fourth objection that the efficiencies would not
18 2
be passed on to consumers.
The question that emerges is whether the competitive effects
efficiencies analysis leads to the slippery slope of rejecting all
efficiencies. It would be helpful in this regard to have more
Canadian information publicly available. If, as argued in this

177. See Frederick Jenny, EEC Merger Controb Economies as an Antitrust
Defence or an Antitrust Attack?, In PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 376-79

(1992) (the author is the Vice President of the French Conseil de la Concurrence);
Fox, supranote 156, at 317.
178. Jenny, supra note 177, at 373-75. See Commission Decision of January
18, 1991 Notification of AT&T/NCR (Case No. IV/M.050) (the Commission did not

challenge the merger); Commission Decision of January 10, 1991 Notification of
Matsushita/MCA (Case No. IV/M.037) (a vertical merger case in which the
Commission did not challenge the merger); Commission Decision of June 28. 1991
Notification of Drager/IBM/HMP (Case No. MIV/M.101) (the Commission did not
challenge the merger).
179. Commission Decision of March 21, 1992 Accor/Wagons-Lits (Case No.
MIV/126).
180. Id. § 25(4).
181. Id. §§ 25(4). 26(2)(a).

182. Id. § 25(4); see also Aerospatlale-AlenaldeHavlUand, supra note 169, at 9
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Article, the Director has applied the competition effects
efficiencies analysis, then evidence that this analysis has been
employed not only to allow borderline mergers but also to
recognize, in appropriate instances, the potential anticompetitive
effects of efficiencies would aid in answering this question.
Before concluding this Part, it is useful to examine briefly the
kinds of efficiencies that the Commission at least has been
prepared to analyze, if not defiitively recognize. In de Havilland,
without prejudicing whether efficiencies were relevant for analysis
under Article 2 of the Merger Regulation, the Commission
calculated efficiencies from: (1) rationalizing plants (production
efficiencies, but no distinction drawn between economies of scale
and scope); (2) parts procurement (transactional efficiencies); and
184
(3) marketing'S3 and product support (dynamic efficiencies).
The Commission did not consider research and development5
8
efficiencies per se because the parties did not claim them,'
although these efficiencies have been recognized in a vertical
merger case, Matsushlta/MCA.l88 The Commission also appears
ready to accept evidence of proven synergistic efficiencies,
although it is seemingly skeptical that these can be proved with
sufficient rigor.187 Thus far, the Commission does not seem
sympathetic to claims of superior management. l8 8
In de
Havilland, the Commission stated that such savings are not "a
consequence of the concentration per se, but are cost savings which
could be achieved by [Boeing] or any other potential acquirer." l8 9
In de Havllland, the Commission considered efficiency losses
in markets other than those relevant for its analysis.290 Logic
would imply that efficiency gains also should be considered in
secondary markets, although the Commission either did not
consider or did not find any evidence to support this view. The
Commission, however, seemed at least willing to consider in dicta
the possibility that efficiency gains might be realized outside the
EC, as long as these were still in the relevant market. Having
initially defined a global geographic market, the Commission

183. See also Matsushlta/MCA, supra note 178, § 11; AT&T/NCR, supra note
178, 8 28.
184. Aerospatlale-Alenta/deHavilland, supra note 169, § 65.
185. Id. f 66.
186. See Matsushta/MCA, supranote 178, N§ 12-13.
187. See Matsushita/MCA, supra note 178, § 13; Drager/IBM/HMP,supra note
178, § 18-19; AT&T/NCR, supranote 178, §§ 28-30.
188. Aerospatlale-Alfena/deHavIlland, supra note 169, §§ 65-67.

189. Id. § 65.
190. Id. § 70, 71. It considered consumers through the effects on regional
airlines, and commuters on 100 seat Jets. The Commission otherwise primarily
focused on aircraft in the 20-70 seat range.
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considered, and then rejected as simply redistributive, gains from
minimizing currency risk.191
In conclusion, the EC treatment of merger-related efficiencies
is in a nascent stage. As suggested in Part II of this Article, the
EC efficiencies analysis is contained implicitly in review
thresholds and explicitly in consideration of the competitive
effects of merger. The problem with EC analysis appears to lie in
the strict construction that the Commission gives to the
efficiencies factor once market dominance has been established.
This may change as the Commission develops alternate theories
19 2
of collusion or interdependent exercise of market power.
Accordingly, the Commission may come to appreciate that an
efficiency gain may create different cost structures among firms
and thus hinder successful collusive agreements.
The
Commission has cautiously recognized production, transaction,
and dynamic efficiencies, although it remains particularly
skeptical of management efficiencies. The Commission has not
yet indicated whether it will consider marginal or average costs in
its analysis.

191. Id. § 68.
192. See Commission Decision of July 22, 1992 Nestle/Perrier (Case No.
IV/M. 190) 1992 O.J. (L 356) (the Commission found a duopoly); see also Re:
Italian Flat Glass: Societa Itallano Vetro SpA v. EC Commission, [1992] 5 CMLR
302 (the Article 86 decision).
There is nothing, in principle, to prevent two or more independent
economic entities from being, on a specific market, united by such
economic links that, by virtue of that fact, together they hold a dominant
position vis-a-vis the other operators on the same market. . . . [E]ven
supposing that the circumstances of the present case lend themselves to
application of the concept of "collective dominant position" (in the sense of
a position of dominance held by a number of independent undertakings),
the Commission has not adduced the necessary proof.
Id. See further the views of the former Competition Commissioner, Sir Leon
Brittan:
It is my belief that the concept of dominance in Article 2 of the Regulation
covers oligopolistic dominance. If a merger or acquisition creates or
reinforces a market structure on which price collusion or price parallelism
between companies is highly likely, that concentration should be
considered incompatible with the common market.
BmTrAN, supra note 156, at 25.
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V. THE UNITED STATES
This Part of the Article examines the United States treatment
of merger-related efficiencies, focusing on current and even prospective, but not historical, approaches. Avoiding the playground
semantics that often surround much of the discussion of the
legislative intent behind the antitrust laws, 19 3 the focus of this
Article is on what should be kept and what should be abandoned
to adapt United States antitrust law 19 4 and policy to the realities
1 95
of the globalization of trade and investment patterns.
No single United States law or policy clearly states the manner in which efficiencies are to be factored into merger analysis;
rather, there are several sources to which one must look for
guidance. First, there is the policy of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion and the "law"
in the form of the administrative practice of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). Second, there is the "law" of the various
states acting as parenspatrlae, enforcing federal antitrust law on
behalf of their own citizens in federal court or enforcing their own
antitrust law in state court. 196 Third, there is the law qua law of
judicial precedent, which may or may not be relied upon by any
of the above-named parties or by any private party seeking to
enjoin a merger.

The Judicial authority supporting either an efficiencies
analysis or defense is not promising. Supreme Court precedent
from the 1960s alternately supports a view that: (1) efficiencies

193. See supra note 4. For those interested in a front-row seat to this aspect
of the debate, see generally, BORK, supra note 40; Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (1982).
194. The basic statutes of concern here are § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1989), which prohibits mergers in restraint of trade, § 2 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1989), which prohibits mergers that form a monopoly, and § 7 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 0 18 (1989), which prohibits mergers if their effect may
be to lessen competition substantially or to tend to create a monopoly.
195. See generally Bergsten & Graham, supra note 33; Rugman & Warner,
supra note 33.
196. NationalAssociation of Attorneys General,HorizontalMerger Guidelines, 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA Special Supp.) (Apr. 1. 1993). 1 will not examine
these guidelines in great detail as I also did not address Member State law in the
context of my discusson of the EC. Briefly, however, the states believe that to the
extent that efficiency was a concern of the Congress, it was expressed in the
legislative finding that less concentration would further that goal. Id. at 5-4.
Furthermore, the states believe that there is no empirical support for the
proposition that mergers in concentrated industries result in substantial
efflciencies. Id. The states, not surprisingly, reject the Williamsonlan tradeoff.
Efficiency does not explicitly enter into the states' analysis of competitive effects.

Id.
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actually should count against a merger, not save it;19 7 (2) a
merger that leads to market power in one market cannot be saved
by proof of efficiencies in some other market;1 9s and (3) possible
efficiencies in one market cannot be used as a defense to market
power in the same market. 19 9
Appeals
More recently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
2 0 ° without
efficiencies,
of
analysis
effects
competitive
a
accepted
making any reference to earlier judicial decisions rejecting an
efficiencies analysis. While the Eleventh Circuit rejected the idea
of an efficiencies defense in the WiUiamsonian sense, 2 0 1 the court
nevertheless termed its competitive analysis test as a
"defense." 20 2 On grounds of judicial economy and capability, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that it would be too difficult to prove that

the efficiencies would be achieved and passed on to consumers. 20 3 The court therefore concluded that a defendant instead

197. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("Congress

appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing
considerations in favor of decentralization.").
198. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963)
("We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which 'may substantially to
lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.").
199. F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("[Plossible
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that
some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck
the balance in favor of protecting competition.").
200. F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991).
The court stated:
It is clear that whether an acquisition would yield significant efficiencies in
the relevant market is an important consideration in predicting whether
the acquisition would substantially lessen competition. Thus, evidence
that a proposed acquisition would create significant efficiencies benefiting
consumers is useful in evaluating the ultimate issue-the acquisition's
overall effect on competition.
IAL
201. Id. at 1222 n.29, citing Procter & Gamble and PhiladelphiaNational Bank
for support ("Of course, once it is determined that a merger would substantially
lessen competition, expected economies, however great, will not insulate the
merger from a Section 7 challenge.").
202. Id. at 1222 n.30. Footnote 30 to the competitive effects analysis states
that "[llt is unnecessary for us to define the parameters of this defense now." Id.

The footnote suggests that this "defense" be limited to proof of significant

efficiencies and that they are not attainable by less restrictive means. Id.
203. Id. at 1223.
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would have to prove that these economies4 "ultimately would
20
benefit competition, and hence consumers."
20 5
Other lower courts also have discussed efficiencies.
Except in the procedural contexts of a preliminary injunction
motion, 20 6 however, no United States court actually has -been
persuaded that significant net efficiencies were proven in
sufficient quantity to override a finding of anticompetitive effect.
On April 2, 1992, the DOJ and the FTC (the Agencies) jointly
released their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 20 7 which establish a
five-part analytical process for determining whether to challenge
a merger.
This process is structurally similar to both the
Canadian and EC approaches, 20 8 beginning with market
definition, turning to market share and concentration thresholds,
and then analyzing the competitive effects of the merger. The
competitive effects analysis is further broken down into an
examination of: (1) the likelihood of the merger lessening

competition through either coordinated or unilateral action; 20 9 (2)
the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of entry; 2 10 (3) potential
2 12
efficiency gains; 2 1 ' and (4) the failure and, exiting of assets.
Even though there can be substantial disagreement over
defining relevant markets and assigning market shares, it is fair
to say that the stage of analysis preceding the competitive effects
probably makes an implicit judgment about the efficiency
properties of mergers. 2 13 The Agencies use the HerflndahlHirschman Index (HHI)2 14 of market concentration to set out the
threshold for merger review. In moderately concentrated industries, those with an HHI range between 1000 to 1800,

204. Id. The court cited Section 3.5 of the 1988 DOJ's Merger Guidelines in
support of this view, but as with the 1992 Agencies Guidelines, the framework
therein is structured as a tradeoff defense.
205. See Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 212-13 for relevant case cites.
206. Id. at 212.
207. 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA Special Supp.) No. 1559 (Apr. 2,
1992) (hereinafter Agencies Guidelines].
208. The first DOJ merger guidelines were issued in 1968 and then went
through successive iterations in 1982 and 1984. Not surprisingly, the structure of
analysis in other Jurisdictions is similar, although the substance may differ.
209. Agencies Guidelines, supranote 207, § 2.
210. Id. § 3.
211. Id. §4.
212. Id. § 5.
213. See Robert Pitofsky, New Deflnitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on
Antitrust, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 1805 (1990). Pitofsky argues essentially that the

Reagan administration enforced at least a 10% SSNIP and not 5%. Id. at 1836.
This suggests that the guidelines may understate that implicit view.
214. Agencies Guidelines, supra note 207, § 1.5. The HHI is calculated by
summing the squares of the market shares of the firms in the market.
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mergers resulting in an HHI increase of more than 100 points are
said to raise "significant competitive concerns" that require
further analysis of competitive effects.215 In highly concentrated
industries, where HHI is greater than 1800, mergers resulting in
an HI increase of between 50 and 100 points also require
further analysis. If, however, the increase is greater than 100
points, then the merger may succeed only upon proof of all the
or that the assets
competitive effects factors and efficiencies,
216
merger.
the
without
market
the
exit
would
The competitive effects analysis requires the Agencies to
determine whether the postmerger market conditions are
conducive to reaching terms of coordination, detecting deviations,
and punishing such deviations. 217 The focus, then, is on
determining whether a merger will lead to the collusion or the
"incipient" exercise of market power. 2 18 The role of efficiencies
should be explicitly included in this inquiry as part of the first
stage of the formal efficiencies analysis. For instance, when
industries contain firms with different cost curves or structures,
it may be more difficult to agree to price and output restraints
and to police them.
The Agencies subsequent entry analysis also seemingly reads
efficiencies against a merger. For example, if one firm is a very
low cost producer and other barriers to entry are otherwise high
(due, for example, to high up-front costs), unless entry would be
profitable and likely in two years, 219 the merger will be
prohibited. 220 However, the efficiency gain that would result from
the merger possibly may reduce costs over time throughout the
industry and may, through emulation, adaptation, or further
innovation, increase competition. Thus, in some cases, concentrating on the ability of these efficiency gains to produce scale
economies and thereby to increase the minimum viable scale may

215. Id. § 1.51(b).
216. Id. § 1.51(c).
217. Id. § 2.1.
218. Id. § 2.11.

219. Id. § 3.2. The Agencies do acknowledge that a longer time frame may be
used when demand conditions are such as to permit consumers to extend the life
of their durable goods.
220. Long entry lags may indicate that high sunk costs which cannot be
recovered in the event of failure may cause minimum efficient scale to be high
relative to market demand. See John C. Hilke & Philip B. Nelson, The Economics
of Entry Lags: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview. 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 365, 371-72
(1993).
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actually deter more long-term entry.2 2 1
Essentially, entry
analysis and efficiencies analysis, at least with respect to timing,
become blurred. 2 22 The point here is not that the Agencies are

wrong in their analysis, but that the positive effects of efficiencies
likewise deserve explicit weighing at this stage.
Assuming that the Agencies are not yet convinced about the
desirability of a merger, the next step is to look at the actual
efficiencies section of the Agencies Guidelines. These guidelines
state that some mergers which might otherwise be challenged
"may be reasonably necessary to achieve significant net
efficiencies." The Agencies impose only two conditions on the use
of this defense: (1) equivalent or comparable savings must not be
reasonably achievable by the parties through other means; and
(2) the expected net efficiencies must be greater the more
significant are the competitive effects and the risks identified in
2
the earlier entry analysis.
With all due respect, this section of the Agencies Guidelines
is of little use in addressing the difficult questions raised in Part
II of this paper. First, "net" efficiencies would seem to include not
only cost savings in the relevant market but in secondary
markets as well. Yet this proposition is not clearly stated in the
Guidelines. Furthermore, one would expect that net efficiencies
would also extend to economies of scale realized outside the
United States. As discussed above, as long as the relevant
market is international or global, this treatment would be
procompetitive, not anticompetitive. The DOJ's International
Guidelines, however, which were issued in 1988 and have been

221. One way that these efficiency gains might increase competition is by
changing the relevant geographic market. Consider a geographic market as the

whole or part of the United States. If a United States firm that could not
previously export into another market because of its cost structure can now
export, it may attract a foreign company to enter the United States market

through trade or investment in order to recoup its lost sales and profits at home.
The mere presence of the United States firm in its home market may drive
emulation or further innovation and increased exports to reduce its lost sales and
profits at home.

See generally Edward M. Graham, Strategic Management and

Transnational Firm Behaviour: A Formal Approach, in THE NATURE OF THE
TRANSNATIONAL FIRM 155 (Christos N. Pitselis & Roger Sugden eds., 1991); Edward
M. Graham, Transatlantic Investment by Multinational Firms: A Rivaltstc
Phenomenon?, I J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 82 (1978).
222. See the remarks of a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General
(Economics) JANUS A. ORDOVER & M. E. GuERiN-CALvElrr, BANK MERGER ANALYSIS
AND THE NEW MERGER GUIDELINES: THE VIEW FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 3031 (1992) ("... if we can conclude entry is easy, then we also implicitly conclude
that efficiencies are [sic ralson d'etre for the merger.").

223. Agencies Guidelines, supra note 207, § 4.
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neither repudiated nor amended on this point, suggest
that these
22 4
efficiencies would not be factored into the analysis.
The principal competitive risk identified in Sections 1 to 3 of

the Agencies Guidelines is that a merger will facilitate collusion
and the exercise of market power with the accompanying ability
to raise prices to consumers. Does this mean that the Agencies
have adopted a wealth transfer calculus in the tradeoff, or have
they adopted the Williamsonian model? Consistent with the
argument of this Article, a strictly construed wealth transfer
model would not provide a good analytical tool, unless the
positive and negative aspects of efficiencies 2were
more clearly
25
emphasized in the competitive effects analysis.
To some extent, the Agencies have attempted to respond to
these questions through speeches made by their officials. Both
the DOJ

226

and the FTC2 27 have indicated that there is, in fact, a

two-part test for efficiencies of the kind this Article recommends.
But the revised Agencies Guidelines, issued in April 1992, did not
explicitly incorporate this test, for reasons that are not made
clear.
In public comments, the DOJ has qualified the definition of
net efficiencies to mean only those that will occur in the relevant
market. 2 28
This view is consistent with the International
Guidelines. The DOJ seems prepared, however, to recognize that

224. Department of Justice. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor International
Operations (Nov. 10, 1988), 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 17. 1988).

See Illustrative Case 1 at 5-25-5-27 involving a merger between a foreign and
United States firm. The DOJ states that they would focus on the merger's "likely
competitive effects in the U.S.," and efficiencies would be weighed against that
harm. Id. at 5-25, 5-27.
225. This is consistent with the view expressed by Fisher that if evidence that
efficiencies would make the merged enterprise "a tougher competitor" were not
allowed, he would not accept a strictly construed efficiencies defense. Fisher,
supra note 38, at 39.
226. See Judy Whalley, In After the Herjlndahls are Counted: Assessment of
Entry and Efficlencles In Merger Enforcement by the Departmentof Justice, Remarks
of the 29th Annual Antitrust Seminar, PLI 19-20 (1989). Whalley is a former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General. See also ORDOVER & GUERiN-CALVERT, supra

note 222, at 20-21.
227. See Kevin J. Arquit, Merger Analysis In the '90's: The Guidelines and
Beyond, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 134 (1992). Arquit is a former Director of the
Bureau of Competition Policy.
228. See Whalley, supra note 226, at 21, 23. See also Memorandum on
Efficiencies in Support of United States' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 6;
United States v. IVACO, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W. D. Mich. 1989) (on file with
the author) [hereinafter IVACO Brief].
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there may be situations in which other markets
2 29
inextricably intertwined with the relevant market.

may be

On the related question of whether the efficiencies must
inure directly to the benefit of consumers in the relevant market,
the Agencie seem hesitant to say no. In other words, they are
reluctant to actually operationalize the Williamsonian tradeoff.
The Agencies still want to weigh the efficiency gain against the
loss in allocative efficiency and the wealth transfer.
In

the

recent

decision

of Honlckman,2 30

the

FTC2 3 1

considered whether a major soft drink bottler could acquire
certain additional soft drink franchises in New York and New
Jersey. 23 2 The FTC found that the substantial net efficiencies in
New York would not outweigh the anticompetitive effects in New
York, but would do so in New Jersey.2 3 3
The FTC's letter,

however, falls to indicate whether Honickman had argued that
the gains in New Jersey could overcome the anticompetitive
effects in that state. Furthermore, the FTC held that, even if
these gains were sufficient, they would not be passed on to
consumers. 23 4 Even Commissioner Yao, while finding in his
dissent that there were significant marketing and distribution
efficiencies, did not question this efficiencies framework. 23 5

229. Whalley, supra note 226, at 23 ("i.e. they share common production

facilities").
230. Harold Honickman, F.T.C. Docket No. 9233, Trade Reg. Rep.
23,286,
1 22,957 (Nov. 16, 1992).
231. The decision was written by Commissioners Azcuenaga and Starek with
Commissioner Owen concurring in part and dissenting in part and Commissioner
Yao dissenting. Id. 22,967.
232. Id. 22,957.
233. Id.
22,965.
234. Id.
22,965 n.26 (Even if the net efficiencies appear to outweigh the
anticompetitive risks, there may be no benefit to consumers. Such a consumer

benefit Is necessary to save an otherwise anticompetitive acquisition.").
235. Id. 22,969 ("Moreover, I am convinced that there are efficlencies to be
gained from Honickmans proposed acquisitions in the New York counties, and
that such efflciencies will be passed on to consumers."). Commissioner Yao's
decision turned on a competitive effects analysis of efficiencies, and thus he may
not have addressed this question squarely. The FTC's position may not be upheld
by the enforcement staff either. Arquit, supra note 227, at 137.
It may further be the case that market power, but not scale economies,
can be achieved instantly upon consummation of the merger. Where this
is so, it may be appropriate to decline taking enforcement action where it
is clear that any price increase will be quickly offset by lower costs
resulting from the attainment of scale economies. Needless to say, this
course of action rapidly becomes less attractive as the time frame for
achieving the efficiency moves outward, and as the probability of
attainment declines.
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The DOJ is slightly more willing to permit a merger when efficiencies outweigh the allocative inefficiency. When some shortterm wealth transfer may result, however, the range of acceptable
efficiencies seems limited to large production efficiencies such as
economies of scale and "other fixed cost saving. " 2 8 Once the

matter gets to court, the DOJ's position is the same as that of the

FTC.237
Before turning to the future, one should review briefly the
types of efficiencies that the Agencies have recognized. The
Agencies Guidelines indicate that production, distribution, and
transactional efficiencies are relevant, specifically listing
economies of scale and scope, distribution advantages, and
synergies.2 8 The Agencies will consider managerial efficiencies
only when they are linked to some specific operation in the
firm.2 9 As in Canada, the costs of achieving these efficiencies
24
are deducted. 0
In looking to the future, one should begin by returning to
Justice Harlan's concurrence in F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble,2 4 ' in

236. James F. Rill. 60 Minutes with the Honorable James F. Rill, Assistant
Attorney General. Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, In 61 ANTrrRUST
L.J. 217, 241 (1992).
237. IVACO Brief, supra note 228, at 8:
The antitrust laws should not be used to deprive consumers of the benefits

of a merger that would result in greater output and lower prices. This is
the underlying rationale for permitting the introduction of efficiencies that
more than offset any anticompetitive potential. The rationale requires,
however, that efficiencies not be considered in the absence of evidence that
the alleged cost savings and other benefits will be passed on to the
consumers who would otherwise have to bear the brunt of an
anticompetitive combination.

ICL
238. See Agencies Guidelines, supra note 207, § 4.
239. Id.
240. F.T.C. v. Alliant Techsystems.Inc., 1992 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,169; 69,175 (D.D.C. Nov. 23, 1992).
241. Justice Harlan stated:

69,047;

If it is conceded, as it must be, that Congress had reasons for favoring
competition, then more efficient operation must have been among them. It
is of course true that a firm's ability to achieve economies enhances its
competitive position, but adverse effects on competitors must be
distinguished from adverse effects on competition.... Economies achieved
by one firm may stimulate matching innovation by others, the very essence
of competition. They always allow the total output to be delivered to the
consumer with an expenditure of fewer resources. Thus when the case
against a conglomerate or product-extension merger rests on a marketstructure demonstration that the likelihood of anticompetitive
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which he clearly enunciated the rationale for an efficiencies
element of a competitive effects test. The Agencies even might
consider quoting from the language of this concurrence in the
next iteration of their guidelines. More to the point, courts that

want to begin to rationalize the divergence between economic
thinking, agency practice, and judicial precedent could rely upon
Justice Harlan's statement. This is in fact exactly what the
Eleventh Circuit did, albeit imperfectly, in F.T.C. v. University
24 2
Health.
Once this competitive effects test Is more clearly established,
it should be possible to fashion a second-stage procedure under
which some kind of Williamsonian tradeoff analysis can be
attempted. The Canadian model offers a good starting point for
accomplishing this objective.
An additional feature of the
Canadian system ought to be considered, however, when looking
to it for guidance. In Canada, as discussed above,m the Director
has three years in which to challenge a merger before the
Tribunal or to monitor the competitive effects of a merger. While
one can debate whether the Director's use of this authority has
always been optimal, in theory at least the Director is permitted
in borderline cases to take a wait and see approach to assessing
efficiencies. If analogous authority were to exist in the United
States,
still
fewer
cases
invoking Williamsonian-type
considerations would reach the judiciary. As recommended
above in the Canadian context, there is no reason why at this
ultimate stage some measure of the redistributive losses should
not be factored explicitly into the tradeoff calculus.

consequences has been substantially increased, the responsible agency

should then move to examine and weigh possible efficiencies arising from
the merger in order to determine whether, on balance, competition has
been substantially lessened. Where detriments to competition are apt to
be "highly speculative" it seems wisest to conclude that "possibilities of
adverse effects on competitive behavior are worth worrying about only
when the merger does not involve substantial economies. . . ." The Court
must proceed with caution in this area lest its decision "over the long run
deter new market entry and tend to stifle the very competition it seeks to
foster."
F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 597-98 (1967) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
242. F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991);
see also United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
243. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. However, unlike Pitofsky, I
would prefer that the procedure be broadly based on all competitive effects (as in
Canada) and not Just proof of effilciencies. See Pitofsky, supranote 51, at 227.
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To be successful in the United States context, the nature of
the private right of action, of course, would have to be altered in
suits brought by competitors. It is not enough to argue that this
"is only a variation on risks that firms already must take."2"
The United States also must find the political will either to limit
suits brought by noncompetitors2 4 5 or to require a party seeking
to assert that right to first obtain the consent of the Attorney
General.
I would extend the Snyder and Kauper proposal,
permitting the Federal government to collect judgments in the
former cases, to the latter category of cases as well. 246 At the
end of the day, the most satisfactory results probably could be
achieved by de-trebling damages for all merger cases brought by
private parties, either alone or in combination with the other
2 47
suggestions.
The biggest caveat to this proposal, however, is the fear that
the Agencies will not have the budget to actually monitor these
efficiencies. In a time of fiscal restraint and budget cutting,
would this proposal represent an attempt to turn the Agencies
into active regulators? The Agencies probably could rely on a
system of private complaints to determine which conditionally

approved mergers warranted closer secondary scrutiny over time.
In Canada, this private-party filtering system has not proven
problematic, but this hardly provides a basis for concluding it
would work in the United States. The United States has a
different legal and social culture, which is seemingly attracted to
litigation. Lawyers simply may flood the Agencies with both
offensive and defensive requests for review. One way to handle
this flood of requests might be to place a heavy burden of proof
on the complaining party at this early stage or to make the losing
party bear the costs of bringing the action. 2 4 s

244. Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 226.
245. See William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga. Antitrust Enforcement and
Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Casefor Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329,
355 (1974) and Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust
Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551 (1991) for the same

recommendation on the grounds that these suits are often anticompetitive.
246. Breit & Elzinga, supra note 245, at 597.
247. This Is already the case with respect to certain notified research and
production joint ventures. See National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15
U.S.C. § 4304 (1984), amended by National Cooperative ProductionAmendments of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993). See generally Mark A.A. Warner
and Alan M. Rugman, Competitiveness: An Emerging Strategy of Discrimination In
U.S. Antitrust and R & D Policy, 25 LAw & Pol INT'L Bus. (forthcoming Apr. 1994).
248. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303-04. The substantially prevailing party in an
antitrust action involving a notified research and, production joint venture can
recover its legal costs including reasonable attorney's fees and prejudgment
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This Part has reviewed the various sources of authority with
respect to the analysis of efficiencies in merger cases. Analysis
has indicated that the Agencies and courts need to use explicitly
a two-stage competitive effects test of efficiencies, which can
capture both the negative and positive aspects of any potential
merger. Second, this Part has suggested supplementing this test
with a tradeoff analysis that includes some measure of wealth
distribution in the calculus. 24 9
Third, this analysis has
suggested institutional change as a necessary correlation,
including the conditional approval of some borderline mergers
and amended use of the private right of action.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR HARMONIZATION AND CONVERGENCE

Part II of this Article reviewed the economics of efficiency in
the context of mergers and the empirical evidence on efficiency
gains from mergers. It concluded that mergers generally lead to
efficiency gains, but not always and not by as much as is often

claimed. Efficiency gains are more likely to be found and to be
substantial in moderately concentrated industries. Accordingly,
this Article has argued that, as a first step in the analytical
process, efficiencies of mergers should be evaluated along with
the overall competitive effects of mergers. There should then be
an explicit, strictly construed balancing test employed by the
relevant reviewing body. This test would weigh a very wide variety of provable and cognizable productive, dynamic, and
transactional efficiency gains against allocative efficiency losses
and some degree of wealth transfer from consumers to producers.
In the case studies of Canada, the EC, and the United States that

interest "if the claim, or the claimants conduct during the litigation of the claim,
was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith." Id. § 4304.
249. A similar approach is advocated by Professor Steven C. Salop of
Georgetown University Law Center:
What needs to be done is that policymakers have to take income
distribution concern into account explicitly and come up with a social
welfare function that balances the Interests of consumer surplus with the
interests of producer surplus.... If this is done, one can formulate a
dynamic efficiencies analysis based on a chosen social welfare function
and that analysis can be put into evaluating overall competitive effects of

the merger.
64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1609. at 387 (Apr. 8, 1993) (quoting
Professor Steven C. Salop). My tradeoff defense, and not my competitive effects

analysis, would correspond to Salop's proposal.
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Boeing."255 In that case, the Director's view of the competitive
nature of the market may have been correct and the
Commission's view wrong.
This Article cannot resolve this dispute. It does highlight,
however, the problem of international merger regulation and the
myriad conflicts that may arise as different national authorities

try at various times to maximize one or all of the possible
productive, allocative, or dynamic efficiency objectives in their
home jurisdictions. The ongoing trade dispute between the EC
and the United States over which is the most egregious subsidizer
or protector of their respective civilian aircraft industries is well
known. 256 One should consider also the real world competitive
concerns faced by a small producer in a small state caught in this
kind of internecine trade war.
Originally a subsidiary of a British company, de Havilland
grew during World War II to take advantage of the benefits of a
Canada-United States preferential defense procurement
agreement. 257
Over time, and with the support and
encouragement of the Canadian government, the Canadian de
Havilland wrested a degree of managerial and innovative
independence from its parent company. 258 Its expertise in small
aircraft, especially short take-off and landing aircraft (STOL),
eventually brought de Havilland into competition with its British
parent. 25 9 Canadian de Havilland was forced by its parent to
cease production; as a result, de Havilland financially
deteriorated to the point that the Canadian government acquired
the company in an attempt to resuscitate it.26 0 These efforts
proved largely unsuccessful because de Havilland needed to be
part of a larger marketing and distribution network; so it was sold
to Boeing subject to certain performance requirements. 261 In the
end, unable to obtain efficiencies from the rationalization of

255. Commission Decision of October 2, 1991 declaring the incompatability
with the Common Market of a Concentration (Case No. IV/M.053-AerospatialeAlenla/de Havilland) 1991 O.J. (L 334), § 71.
256. See generally TYSON, supra note 2.

257. Chris DeBresson et al., Technological Linkages and Foreign Ownership In
the CanadianAircraft Industry, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EcONOMIC
GROWTH, supra note 34, at 317, 319. See generally MARK A.A. WARNER, A HISTORY
OF UNITED STATES-CANADA TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONS IN MULTINATIONALS AND
CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE 16, 20-2 1.

258. DeBresson et al., supranote 257, at 323-26.
259. Id. at 334-35.
260. Id. This experience was common in Canada as Canada tried to develop a
niche in the highly supported aerospace market. Id.
261. Id. at 335.
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followed, the Article looked for support for this view and
suggested ways of operationalizing it at the national level.
Along the way, this Article pointed out potential areas for
international conflict in merger regulation arising out of the use
of efficiencies analysis. This Article will examine these potential
conflicts in greater detail to suggest institutional prerequisites to
merger analysis as first, second, and third-best solutions.
A good starting point is de Havilland, in which the
Commission pointed to the intersection of competition policy and
industrial policy.
The parties did not claim research and
development efficiencies, because these activities on the part of
de Havilland were the subject of performance requirements
imposed by the Canadian government. 2 50 In September 1991,
the Director indicated that the acquisition raised "insufficient
competition concerns in Canada."25 1 A number of commentators
have suggested that Canada was engaging in industrial policy in
this case. 2 52 The Director did not cite efficiencies in reaching his
decision not to challenge the acquisition; however, based on the
2 53
record described above, it is likely that they were a factor.
It is equally plausible that the Director, while probably
finding a global geographic market, also found a single civilian
product airplane market, not the smaller twenty to seventy seat
market determined by the Commission. 2 5 ' As the Commission
itself noted, in the larger product market, the United Kingdom
and German competitors (British Aerospace and Fokker,
respectively) were "already facing strong competition from

250. Commission Decision of October 2, 1991 declaring the incompatability
with the Common Market of a Concentration (Case No. IV/M.053-AerospataleAlenla/de HavIlland) 1991 O.J. (L 334), at 66.

251. See 1992 Din. INVESTIGATION & RES. ANN.

REP., supranote

154, at 7.

252. See Bos Er AL.. supra note 158, at 230 ("the Commission included
industrial policy concerns in its decision but not in favor of the markets directly

concerned... but rather in favor of a neighboring market."); see also Id. at 230,
n. 122 ("It may be that the Canadian authorities themselves apparently have been
pursuing industrial policy objectives."): Fox, supra note 156, at 318.
253. See Derek Ireland et al.. Globalization, the CanadianCompetition Act; and
the Future Policy Agenda 5 (May 1993) (a recent discussion paper prepared by the

Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy) ("The Canadian Bureau decided not to
challenge the merger because of the efficiency gains in Canada, the limited
competitive effects on the small Canadian market for commuter aircraft, and
because of the potential that de Havilland was a failing firm.").

254. See supra note 190.

Here I am not dealing with the three smaller

markets actually found by the Commission, but rather the Commission's best

case scenario.
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production in the United States because of 26these
requirements,
2
Boeing tried to sell de Havilland to Aerospatiale.
This brief history points to the key question: What is the
correct posture (from the point of view of national welfare) of
national antitrust authorities toward efficiencies analysis in a
world of second-best solutions?
Former EC Competition
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan 2 63 and Fox, 2 64 both praise the de
Havilland decision for not using the efficiencies analysis to
promote national champions or other industrial policy goals. As
discussed above, however, this view assumes that the
Commission, and not the Canadian Director, correctly viewed the
relevant product market. 2 6 5 To find a partial answer to this question, one can look for insights from the "New" or "Strategic" Trade
266
Theory.
New Trade Theory represents an attempt to integrate some of
the recent game theory insights of industrial organization
economics into the older tradition of the economics of
international trade. 2 6 7 New Trade Theory emphasizes: (1) the
realities of imperfect competition; (2) industries that display
increasing and not constant returns to scale; and (3) the
possibility of external economies or the spillover of the kinds of

efficiencies discussed in this Article between a firm, an industry,
and other firms and other industries. 2 6s
Paul Krugman
distinguishes between two distinct branches in this economic
literature.
The older branch emphasizes the strategic use of industrial
policy, aimed at identifying industries possessing economic rents
as a result of imperfect competition. Once these industries are
identified, this approach recommends trying to choose national

262. Id. De Havilland eventually was purchased from Boeing; 51% by
Bombardier Inc., a Montreal-based transportation company, and 49% by the
Government of the Province of Ontario. See 1992 DiR. INVESTIGATION & REs. ANN.
REP., supra note 154, at 7.

263. See BRITrAN, supra note 156, at 7.
264. See Fox, supra note 156, at 315, 325.
265. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
266. See generally Paul R. Krugman, Does the New Trade Theory Require a
New Trade Policy?, 15 WORLD EcON. 423 (July 1992) [hereinafter Krugman 19921;
Paul R. Krugman, The Narrow and BroadArguments ForFree Trade, 83 AM. ECON.
REv. PAPERS & PRoc. 362 (May 1993); J.D. Richardson. "New" Trade Theory and
Policy A Decade Old. Assessment in a Pac!fic Context, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 4042 (Apr. 1992); Ordover & Sykes. supranote 155.
267. See Krugman 1992, supra note 266, at 424-27 (citing Avinash K. Dixit &
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 297 (1977)).

268. Krugman 1992, supra note 266, at 425-27.
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policies to dominate those industries and to capture the economic
rents for the national economy.2 69

However, Krugman surveys

the empirical evidence and concludes that while these policies
may be export-enhancing, they are often national welfare27 0
reducing.
The more recent branch of the literature, in contrast,
emphasizes the external economies justification for strategic industrial policy. In essence, this branch aims: (1) to capture the
gains from exploiting economies from increasing returns to scale
in large international markets of tradeable goods; and (2) to then
capture these economies in some national nontradeable good and
service, such as labor. 27 1 Krugman suggests that it may be
theoretically possible for a "clever" national government
systematically to "slice" off sectors from other states, through
temporary subsidy or protection that lasts just long enough to
change the pattern of comparative advantage between arid among
states. 27 2 Krugman acknowledges the dangers to which these
policies might give way:
costly rent-seeking and other XInefficiencies that ultimately might prove to be national welfare-

reducing. 27 3 Nonetheless, Krugman reluctantly adopts what he
terms a "cautious activist" approach and, by implication, would
seem to favor an efficiencies analysis for antitrust purposes that
would not prima facie abandon industrial policy concerns.
To be sure, this view would attract critics in antitrust
circles. 2 74 These critics would argue that competition policy is as
much cultural as it is economic, or that the cultural component
is a key component of the economic. Accordingly, these critics
are leery that increased market power at home, even if some of
the costs of that market power are not borne by domestic
consumers, 27 5 ultimately may be aggregate welfare-reducing from
a national perspective.
It is still true, however, that these New Trade Theory insights
are likely to be at best redistributive and at worst welfarereducing in terms of aggregate world welfare. In fact, Krugman

269. Id. at 431-33.
270. Id. at 435.
271. Id. at 435-36.
272. Id. at 437.
273. Id. at 439-40.
274. See generally BRiTTAN, supra note 156, at 3, 21, 25; Fox, supra note 156,
at 325; Eleanor M. Fox, Federalism,Standardsand Common Market MergerControl,
1988 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INsT., supra note 155, at 23-1 to 23-9.
275. See Ordover & Sykes, supra note 155, at 4-6 to 4-10. However, while

these authors recognize the problem, they believe that antitrust analysis should
make some effort at netting out the efficiency and welfare effects of a merger. Id.
See also Harris, supra note 34.
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has suggested that if many states attempt to pursue similar
policies, the results may lead to the classic Prisoners' Dilemma,
the net effect of which may be to reduce national, as well as
27 6
global, welfare.
Reconsidering the much vaunted Canadian treatment of efficiencies in merger analysis, the question still remains whether
the policy of seeking export promotion efficiencies really has been
or ultimately will prove to be national welfare-enhancing?
Ultimately, the resolution of that question is an empirical matter.
However, this analysis seems to argue for a more sophisticated
competitive effects efficiencies merger standard that is fully
capable of accommodating these rich new economic insights. If
the EC was correct in its market definition in de Havilland, then
perhaps there is some merit in the more cautious European and
United States approaches to recognizing efficiencies.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This Article's analysis points to the need for a priority list of
approaches to efficiencies that address the international realities
of'merger review. Boddez and Trebilcock have proposed such a
scheme in the context of dumping and predatory price
discrimination under the proposed North American Free Trade
277
Agreement.
Borrowing from their approach, this Article offers the
following three-part classification solution. The best regime

would be some appropriately constituted institutional mechanism
to review mergers with some sufficiently high "international
dimension" (to borrow from the EC model).27 8 That would seem
the only institution capable of sorting through 1he competing
claims and interests of efficiency-based merger analysis.
A second-best solution would consist of continued attempts
to harmonize international standards and increase ties between
national authorities, with the hope that these ties might reduce
the incentives to resort to rent-seeking efficiencies analyses of

276. Krugman 1992, supra note 266, at 437-38.
277. THoMAS M. BODDEZ & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN NORTH AMERICA 203-58 (1992).
278. Richardson, supra note 266, at 28-29. I have discussed elsewhere the
appropriate institutional prerequisites to a supra-national competition authority
in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement. See Edward M.
Graham & Mark AA. Warner. Multinationals and Competition Policy In North
America, In MULTINATINALS IN NoRTH AMERIcA (Lorraine Eden ed., 1994).

1116

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vo126:1059

mergers. 2 79 The basic standard for this analysis would be the
one this Article consistently has argued; that is, merger-related
efficiencies should be evaluated along with the overall competitive
effects of mergers, followed by a strictly construed tradeoff
analysis.
As a third-best solution, each national competition authority
could attempt to implement on its own the kind of competitive
effects efficiencies analysis of mergers that the Article has
advocated. This analysis could be further supplemented by a
fairly strict exception or tradeoff defense.

279. BmnTAN, supra note 156. at 108; Bergsten & Graham, supra note 33, at
39-40.

